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Sending troops after an attack in Nigeria can be counterproductive. The military is too overstretched to maintain a presence, so the intervention often provokes reprisal attacks against local communities once the soldiers have left, increasing long-term risk for civilians.
The Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, without Hamas being disarmed or an international force in place, creates a space for violent clashes. Hamas, armed gangs, and powerful clans are already competing for control, illustrating a critical risk in phased peace plans where security is not transferred seamlessly.
Contrary to the image of mercenaries as universally brutal, data shows that private military companies based in democratic countries are associated with a 66% lower rate of civilian victimization compared to those from non-democracies, likely due to corporate accountability and reputational concerns.
An act of aggression can become so popular domestically that leaders feel compelled to see it through, even if initially intended as a negotiating tactic. The Argentine junta found the Falklands invasion was "the most popular thing they'd ever done," trapping them in a conflict they couldn't easily abandon.
The policy of rotating commanders on one-year tours was a critical strategic flaw in Afghanistan. Each new commander arrived believing they had the "recipe for success" and would change the strategy, resulting in a series of disconnected, short-term plans that prevented long-term progress.
Unlike historical conflicts with pitted armies, a contemporary American civil war would manifest as exploding political violence. The key dynamic is that state attempts to suppress this violence would themselves become a primary cause for more violence, creating a dangerous feedback loop seen in conflicts in Algeria, Vietnam, and Syria.
The "kingpin strategy" of targeting cartel leaders can be counterproductive. Removing a strong leader like El Mencho, who maintained vertical control, often leads to the cartel's fragmentation. This results in violent internecine conflicts as factions vie for power, ultimately increasing overall violence in the region.
Violence in Nigeria is not from a single entity like Boko Haram, which has splintered. The crisis is a complex interplay between competing jihadist factions and non-ideological criminal "bandits." These groups compete for territory and resources, creating a chaotic and rapidly spreading conflict.
The successful crackdown on the relatively business-minded Sinaloa cartel created a power vacuum. This void was filled by the more brutal Jalisco New Generation Cartel, which uses extreme violence as its primary business model. This inadvertently worsened the security situation by replacing a predictable actor with a chaotic one.
Nations like the US and USSR prolong involvement in failed conflicts like Afghanistan primarily due to "reputational risk." The goal shifts from achieving the original mission to avoiding the perception of failure, creating an endless commitment where objectives continually morph.
The core weakness of U.S. foreign intervention isn't a lack of military or economic power, but a lack of seriousness about the aftermath. The U.S. lacks the patience, humility, and stamina for the difficult, unglamorous work of post-conflict planning and nation-building, dooming interventions to failure.