The successful crackdown on the relatively business-minded Sinaloa cartel created a power vacuum. This void was filled by the more brutal Jalisco New Generation Cartel, which uses extreme violence as its primary business model. This inadvertently worsened the security situation by replacing a predictable actor with a chaotic one.
The Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, without Hamas being disarmed or an international force in place, creates a space for violent clashes. Hamas, armed gangs, and powerful clans are already competing for control, illustrating a critical risk in phased peace plans where security is not transferred seamlessly.
When cities stop prosecuting crimes like shoplifting under the assumption it's driven by poverty, they inadvertently create a lucrative market for organized crime. Sophisticated gangs exploit this leniency to run large-scale theft operations, harming the community more than the original policy intended to help.
Established industries often operate like cartels with unwritten rules, such as avoiding aggressive marketing. New entrants gain a significant edge by deliberately violating these norms, forcing incumbents to react to a game they don't want to play. This creates differentiation beyond the core product or service.
Organized crime in Latin America is evolving as drug gangs diversify their portfolios into human trafficking. They repurpose existing infrastructure, such as corrupt official contacts and money laundering networks built for the cocaine trade, to run these new operations. This strategic shift has turned previously separate criminal networks into interconnected 'best friends.'
The Mexican government's headline statistic on falling murder rates is misleading. A more comprehensive analysis including 'disappeared' persons, femicides, and manslaughter reveals a much more modest, though still significant, decline. This highlights how official data can obscure the full reality of a security situation.
President Sheinbaum's early success in reducing crime stems from appointing Omar Hafush, a data-driven former police officer, as security minister. Unlike his political predecessors, Hafush uses data, coordinates intelligence, and leverages financial crime units to target cartels more effectively, demonstrating the power of expert leadership.
The actual business of a high-level drug enterprise is not just selling a product, but managing immense risk. Their competitive advantage—their "moat"—is the ability to navigate a system of extreme violence and legal peril, which requires a high level of entrepreneurial skill.
Mexico's progress against crime is highly localized. While states like Zacatecas see murder rates fall steeply due to methodical police reform, others like Sinaloa remain nightmarish 'war zones' controlled by cartels. This demonstrates that national-level policies do not produce uniform results on the ground.
Drug trafficking has shifted from vertically integrated cartels to a fluid network of specialized subcontractors. This model, similar to tech manufacturing, makes the supply chain more resilient to disruption and fosters innovation in cultivation, smuggling, and money laundering, making it harder for law enforcement to disrupt.
In times of extreme polarization, the political middle is not a safe haven but a kill zone. Moderates are targeted by both sides because they have no tribe to defend them. The escalating cost of neutrality forces everyone to pick a side, eliminating compromise and accelerating conflict.