After deposing a leader, the success of a foreign intervention hinges on whether the nation retains enough competent bureaucrats, engineers, and judges with experience in a functioning, democratic society to rebuild. Without this institutional memory, the state will likely collapse into chaos.

The raid on Maduro is presented as an opportunity for special forces units to demonstrate their value to an administration wary of large, troop-intensive occupations. This "surgical strike" model offers a politically palatable alternative to the costly nation-building efforts of the 2000s in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Luckey argues that US foreign policy is shifting away from direct military intervention. The new, more effective strategy is to arm allies, turning them into "prickly porcupines" that are difficult to attack. This approach maintains US influence and economic benefits while avoiding the political and human cost of deploying troops.

After 1991, without the Soviet Union as a counterbalancing power, US foreign policy shifted from pragmatic containment to an interventionist, 'neocon' crusade. This ideology of a 'responsibility to protect' led to costly, destabilizing 'forever wars' in the Middle East, a departure from the more measured Cold War approach.

The U.S. action in Venezuela should be viewed as 'regime alteration.' Unlike the failed Iraq strategy of dismantling a state, this was a targeted move to swap a leader aligned with China and Russia for one answerable to the U.S. It’s a pragmatic assertion of influence, not an idealistic attempt at democratization.

American military operations often begin with impressive displays of technological and operational excellence, much like a Bond film's opening scene. However, they frequently devolve into confusion and mediocrity due to a lack of coherent long-term strategy, leading to costly and disastrous outcomes.

The "absolutely clinical" US raid to capture Venezuela's president is lauded as a military success. However, historical precedents from Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 show that initial military prowess in toppling a regime is no guarantee of long-term strategic success, which depends on far more complex political factors.

The failure of Western nation-building highlights a key principle: establishing durable institutions must precede the promotion of democratic ideals. Without strong institutional frameworks for order, ideals like "freedom" can lead to chaos. America’s own success was built on inherited institutions, a luxury many developing nations lack, making the export of democracy exceptionally difficult.

The inability to execute basic administrative functions, like correctly appointing a prosecutor, is more than just embarrassing—it's a national security risk. It projects weakness and incompetence on the world stage, eroding the 'brand' of American capability and emboldening adversaries who see a clown car instead of a superpower.