Once Chinese intervention in the Korean War created a stalemate, Stalin saw the conflict as a perfect opportunity. He believed it would drain American resources and delay China's rise, all while keeping Russia out of direct conflict—a low-risk, high-reward strategy of "fighting to the last Chinese."

The policy of rotating commanders on one-year tours was a critical strategic flaw in Afghanistan. Each new commander arrived believing they had the "recipe for success" and would change the strategy, resulting in a series of disconnected, short-term plans that prevented long-term progress.

Alexander Stubb outlines a threefold failure for Putin: strategically, he pushed Finland into NATO; militarily, he’s achieved minimal gains at catastrophic cost (e.g., 34,000 Russian soldiers killed in Dec.); and economically, Russia is crippled. Putin continues the war not to win, but to avoid the domestic fallout of admitting defeat.

American military operations often begin with impressive displays of technological and operational excellence, much like a Bond film's opening scene. However, they frequently devolve into confusion and mediocrity due to a lack of coherent long-term strategy, leading to costly and disastrous outcomes.

The US stopped its ground offensive in Iraq after 100 hours, short of toppling Saddam Hussein. This was because the Soviet Union drew a red line: no regime change. Preserving Gorbachev's cooperation to finalize the end of the Cold War was the primary strategic goal, superseding objectives in Iraq.

The "absolutely clinical" US raid to capture Venezuela's president is lauded as a military success. However, historical precedents from Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 show that initial military prowess in toppling a regime is no guarantee of long-term strategic success, which depends on far more complex political factors.

In the current political environment, foreign policy decisions like military strikes can be driven less by strategic objectives and more by their value as 'memes' or content. The primary goal becomes looking 'cool as fuck' and projecting strength, rather than achieving a tangible outcome.

Soviet leaders who lived through WWII understood the unpredictability of direct conflict and preferred proxy wars. Vladimir Putin, in contrast, has consistently used direct "hot wars"—from Chechnya to Georgia to Ukraine—as a primary tool to consolidate power and boost his domestic popularity.

The core weakness of U.S. foreign intervention isn't a lack of military or economic power, but a lack of seriousness about the aftermath. The U.S. lacks the patience, humility, and stamina for the difficult, unglamorous work of post-conflict planning and nation-building, dooming interventions to failure.