Contrary to claims of its failure, nuclear deterrence is working by successfully preventing direct military intervention by major powers (e.g., NATO in Ukraine). Its effectiveness is often misjudged because it isn't designed to deter all forms of conflict or lesser aggression, but to prevent catastrophic, direct confrontations.

The greatest risk of nuclear weapon use is not a peacetime accident but a nation facing catastrophic defeat in a conventional war. The pressure to escalate becomes immense when a country's conventional forces are being eradicated, as it may see nuclear use as its only path to survival.

The world is observing two key events: Ukraine was attacked *after* giving up its nuclear arsenal, and Iran was attacked while *pursuing* one. Analyst Fiona Hill argues this creates a powerful incentive for nations to acquire nuclear weapons as the sole guarantor of sovereignty, potentially triggering widespread proliferation.

With the New START treaty gone and doubts about America's commitment to "extended deterrence," especially under Donald Trump, allies in Europe and Asia are debating acquiring their own nuclear weapons. This could lead to a dangerous proliferation free-for-all, increasing the risk of preemptive strikes.

The military occupation of Chernobyl and Zaporizhia created a new category of nuclear threat for which no international protocols exist. Unlike accidents, these were deliberate acts of war, demonstrating a shocking disregard for global safety and revealing a massive gap in international law and preparedness.

Previously taboo, the use of tactical nuclear weapons is entering mainstream strategic discussions. The US might consider it against Iran's fortified nuclear sites, and Russia against Ukraine. This shift indicates a dangerous escalation in geopolitical risk where limited nuclear use is no longer unthinkable.

Nuclear deterrence works because the weapons provide a "crystal ball effect." Unlike WWI leaders who couldn't foresee 1918's carnage, modern leaders have a stark, pessimistic view of a nuclear war's outcome. This shared vision of guaranteed calamity creates enormous incentives to avoid starting such a conflict.

The invasion has crippled Russia's long-term prospects. It has suffered generational setbacks in economic and demographic development, diminished its global reputation, and triggered a massive military buildup in Europe, worsening its security position.

The current geopolitical landscape shows that nations with nuclear weapons can act with impunity, while non-nuclear nations are vulnerable. The West's hesitant support for Ukraine reinforces this lesson, creating a rational incentive for smaller countries to pursue their own nuclear deterrents, risking dangerous proliferation.