Russia sees itself as the weaker party against NATO and is deterred from a direct attack. The greater danger lies in miscalculation, misunderstandings, or incidents (like instability in Belarus or hybrid warfare) spiraling out of control.
Russia perceives itself as having momentum and believes its military position will strengthen in the coming months. This confidence removes any urgency to negotiate or make significant concessions, making it the most significant impediment to ending the conflict.
A ceasefire won't eliminate underlying tensions. Instead, it could create new flashpoints, such as a breakdown of the agreement or instability in Belarus, potentially dragging NATO into a future conflict more directly than the current war.
The invasion has crippled Russia's long-term prospects. It has suffered generational setbacks in economic and demographic development, diminished its global reputation, and triggered a massive military buildup in Europe, worsening its security position.
This strategy involves supplying Ukraine only with defensive systems (like air defense) during peacetime. Offensive capabilities (long-range missiles) would be stockpiled nearby and immediately provided if Russia violates the ceasefire, creating a powerful incentive for compliance.
Different parties are negotiating separate security guarantees and other arrangements in isolation. This prevents the necessary trade-offs for a holistic deal. A successful outcome requires getting all key stakeholders at the same table to discuss all issues together.
This model, from the Iran nuclear deal, pre-commits the West to automatically reinstate sanctions and supply advanced weapons if Russia breaks the ceasefire. This removes political friction and creates a more credible deterrent than vague promises of future action.
Russia views the presence of NATO-member troops as an unacceptable condition. The UK and French promise of such a deployment acts as a poison pill in negotiations, making a ceasefire agreement less likely, rather than serving as a credible deterrent against future aggression.
Despite the war being partly triggered by Ukraine's westward drift, Russia has accepted its EU path since early 2022. This is an underappreciated concession reflecting the reality that Russia has lost the contest for political and economic influence over government-controlled Ukraine.