A state cannot test its systems for eliminating an adversary's entire nuclear arsenal without the test itself being mistaken for the start of a real war. This inability to rehearse creates fundamental, irreducible uncertainty about the plan's effectiveness for any potential attacker.

PGIM's Daleep Singh argues that the risk of mutually assured destruction prevents direct military conflict between nuclear powers. This channels confrontation into the economic sphere, using tools like sanctions and trade policy as primary weapons of statecraft.

China's nuclear strategy differs from the Cold War dynamic. While the US and Soviets were near parity, incentivizing de-escalation, China lags far behind with only 600 warheads to the US's 5,300. This massive gap provides a strong strategic incentive for China to rapidly build its arsenal to gain leverage, particularly regarding Taiwan.

In global conflicts, a nation's power dictates its actions and outcomes, not moral righteousness. History shows powerful nations, like the U.S. using nuclear weapons, operate beyond conventional moral constraints, making an understanding of power dynamics more critical than moralizing.

The core driver of a 'Thucydides Trap' conflict is the psychological distress experienced by the ruling power. For the U.S., the challenge to its identity as '#1' creates a disorienting fear and paranoia, making it prone to miscalculation, independent of actual military or economic shifts.

Nations like Poland pursuing nuclear weapons signals a global shift away from a rules-based international order. Countries increasingly realize national security depends on raw military and economic power, not alliances and treaties.

Nuclear deterrence works because the weapons provide a "crystal ball effect." Unlike WWI leaders who couldn't foresee 1918's carnage, modern leaders have a stark, pessimistic view of a nuclear war's outcome. This shared vision of guaranteed calamity creates enormous incentives to avoid starting such a conflict.

We are living in a historically abnormal period of peace defined by three numbers: 80 years without a great power war, 80 years without nuclear weapon use, and only 9 nuclear states. This fragile peace, the longest since Roman times, is not a natural state and is constantly eroding, requiring active work to sustain.

The current geopolitical landscape shows that nations with nuclear weapons can act with impunity, while non-nuclear nations are vulnerable. The West's hesitant support for Ukraine reinforces this lesson, creating a rational incentive for smaller countries to pursue their own nuclear deterrents, risking dangerous proliferation.