Modern defense strategy requires balancing two historical doctrines: Eisenhower's maximal nuclear deterrence and Maxwell Taylor's proportional force for smaller conflicts. Relying solely on a nuclear threat creates a 'deterrence gap' for minor incursions, necessitating a spectrum of flexible capabilities.

Russia sees itself as the weaker party against NATO and is deterred from a direct attack. The greater danger lies in miscalculation, misunderstandings, or incidents (like instability in Belarus or hybrid warfare) spiraling out of control.

PGIM's Daleep Singh argues that the risk of mutually assured destruction prevents direct military conflict between nuclear powers. This channels confrontation into the economic sphere, using tools like sanctions and trade policy as primary weapons of statecraft.

Nuclear deterrence works because the weapons provide a "crystal ball effect." Unlike WWI leaders who couldn't foresee 1918's carnage, modern leaders have a stark, pessimistic view of a nuclear war's outcome. This shared vision of guaranteed calamity creates enormous incentives to avoid starting such a conflict.

We are living in a historically abnormal period of peace defined by three numbers: 80 years without a great power war, 80 years without nuclear weapon use, and only 9 nuclear states. This fragile peace, the longest since Roman times, is not a natural state and is constantly eroding, requiring active work to sustain.

In a world where nations can no longer rely on external protectors, peace is maintained through deterrence. Increasing defense spending and achieving strategic autonomy is a paradoxical but necessary step to make the cost of war prohibitively high for aggressors.

The current geopolitical landscape shows that nations with nuclear weapons can act with impunity, while non-nuclear nations are vulnerable. The West's hesitant support for Ukraine reinforces this lesson, creating a rational incentive for smaller countries to pursue their own nuclear deterrents, risking dangerous proliferation.

European rhetoric about 'strategic autonomy' is ultimately hollow. For decades, Europe's security has been guaranteed by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, a public good it cannot afford or politically agree to replicate. This fundamental dependency ensures Europe cannot truly break from U.S. foreign policy, regardless of leadership style.

The common belief that a large weapons stockpile deters adversaries is flawed. The war in Ukraine demonstrated that the true measure of deterrence is a nation's industrial capacity—the factory's ability to rapidly regenerate and replace assets consumed in conflict.