Iran perceives the conflict not as a regional dispute but as a direct threat to its existence. Its strategy is to make the war so costly for adversaries that it secures long-term guarantees against future attacks, framing its actions through a lens of survival.

The US offered financial incentives for peace, failing to grasp that Iran's goal was not money but solidifying regional dominance. The agreement's clauses on controlling the Strait of Hormuz and establishing a sphere of influence were Iran's primary objectives, which the US negotiator seemingly overlooked.

The White House believes a $300B investment fund will incentivize Iran to change its behavior. This assumes economic motivations override deep-seated ideological goals, a common Western miscalculation when dealing with such regimes.

Deterrence happens in the mind of the enemy. The US fails to deter Iran by attacking its Arab proxies because Iranian culture views Arabs as expendable. To be effective, deterrence must threaten what the target culture actually values. In Iran's case, this means threatening Persians, not their proxies.

Engaging only with formal Iranian negotiators while ignoring hardliner factions like the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) leads to failed diplomacy. The IRGC is the true power center in Iran, and any agreement made without their buy-in is unlikely to be honored or effective, as they control the actual military assets.

The Iranian regime consistently treats its economy as a means to an ideological end (e.g., self-sufficiency), not as an end in itself. This explains why Western diplomatic strategies based on economic incentives often fail; the leadership is unwilling to compromise its ideology for popular prosperity.

Leaders often assume that applying pressure will force an opponent to the negotiating table. This strategy can fail when the adversary operates under a different logic or, as with Iran's decentralized military, when there is no single authority left to negotiate with, revealing a critical cognitive bias.

The U.S. mistakenly assumes Iran will react rationally to military pressure, as the West would. However, Iran's regime has a different calculus, valuing time and being more willing to let its populace suffer, making stalling tactics highly effective against American political and economic pressures.

A viable nuclear deal with Iran exists, structurally similar to the JCPOA. The primary barrier is not substance, but a clash of styles. Trump needs to publicly "win" and show he made Iran concede, while Iran's leadership culture cannot accept any deal that smacks of public surrender.