China is strategically adopting a posture of stability and order-keeping. This contrasts with America's perceived role as a disruptor, allowing China to position itself as a protector of other nations' interests and subtly shift the global balance without being overtly revisionist.
By successfully demonstrating its ability to close the Strait of Hormuz, Iran has fundamentally altered the deterrence equation. The threat is now a proven capability, not a hypothetical, which grants Iran a more credible and powerful card to play in future conflicts and diplomatic standoffs.
A single Trump term was viewed globally as an aberration, but a second would force a permanent recalculation of America's reliability. All countries will adjust their relationship with the US, making it significantly more challenging for any future administration to sustain America's traditional global leadership role.
While the previous Supreme Leader's caution kept Iran from weaponizing, his death and the rise of a leader closer to the IRGC increases the likelihood of a push for a nuclear bomb. The new leadership is more risk-tolerant and convinced a nuclear deterrent is necessary for survival.
Jake Sullivan, reflecting on the post-October 7th period, concludes that the Biden administration should have applied more pressure on the Israeli government to change its approach in Gaza. This marks a significant admission and signals a potential future shift towards more conditional support for Israel.
The notion that tough export controls deny diplomatic space for AI risk discussions with China is a "mental model error." The Biden administration proved it's possible to compete vigorously by implementing chip restrictions while simultaneously engaging in government-to-government dialogue on AI-enabled nuclear risk.
A viable nuclear deal with Iran exists, structurally similar to the JCPOA. The primary barrier is not substance, but a clash of styles. Trump needs to publicly "win" and show he made Iran concede, while Iran's leadership culture cannot accept any deal that smacks of public surrender.
The argument that US export controls on advanced chips backfired by incentivizing China to develop its own industry is flawed. China had publicly declared its goal to indigenize its chip stack and invested heavily in it since the mid-2010s, long before the most stringent US controls were enacted.
China currently believes its strategy of coercion against Taiwan is succeeding, making a near-term military invasion unlikely. However, 2028 is a critical year. If Taiwan's pro-independence party wins re-election, Beijing may reassess its strategy and consider more dramatic military action.
The "invisible hand" of the market has led to the hollowing out of America's industrial base. The US should learn from China's focus on production and scale, adapting tools like public investment to crowd in private capital for frontier industries, rather than fully copying China's state-directed model.