Decades of adding regulations without subtracting have made the current defense procurement framework unsalvageable through minor adjustments. To achieve necessary speed and efficiency, policymakers must abandon the current system and start fresh, focusing on outcome-based contracts rather than process compliance.

Prepared realized it couldn't win against GovTech incumbents on their terms of sales relationships and lobbying. Their strategy was to fundamentally shift the competition. By offering a free, easy-to-use product, they forced the purchasing decision to be about technology quality, an arena where they could excel.

The government's procurement process often defaults to bidding out projects to established players like Lockheed Martin, even if a startup presents a breakthrough. Success requires navigating this bureaucratic reality, not just superior engineering.

A major shift in government procurement for space defense now favors startups. The need for rapid innovation in a newly contested space environment has moved the government from merely tolerating startups to actively seeking them out over traditional prime contractors.

A major upcoming change in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) is the removal of "past performance" as a key criterion in procurement. This rule has historically favored large, incumbent defense contractors over innovative startups. Eliminating it allows new companies to compete on the merits of their technology, representing a significant unlock for the entire defense tech ecosystem.

In the public sector, the goal is not to outcompete rivals but to improve service delivery. A government CPO's version of competitive research involves talking to counterparts in other states, partnering with civic tech organizations, and learning from innovative vendors to understand best practices.

Anduril advocates for performance-based contracts, a controversial model in government where payment is contingent on the product working. This forces internal accountability and aligns their interests with the customer's, contrasting with traditional cost-plus models that place all risk on the government.

Unlike private enterprises, government-run entities are inherently inefficient. They lack the two fundamental drivers of improvement: market-based price signals and direct competition, which remove any incentive to innovate or improve.

Challenging the myth of slow government procurement, the Department of Energy completed an eight-figure software deal with a brand new vendor in just five weeks. This speed was possible because the vendor presented a strong ROI and a solution to an urgent, high-level problem, proving that bureaucracy can move fast for clear priorities.