A major upcoming change in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) is the removal of "past performance" as a key criterion in procurement. This rule has historically favored large, incumbent defense contractors over innovative startups. Eliminating it allows new companies to compete on the merits of their technology, representing a significant unlock for the entire defense tech ecosystem.

Related Insights

The Department of Defense is moving from rigid, program-specific contracts to a portfolio model. New Portfolio Acquisition Executives can now reallocate funds from underperforming projects to more promising startups mid-stream, rewarding agility and results over incumbency.

The conflict in Ukraine exposed the vulnerability of expensive, "exquisite" military platforms (like tanks) to inexpensive technologies (like drones). This has shifted defense priorities toward cheap, mass-producible, "attritable" systems. This fundamental change in product and economics creates a massive opportunity for startups to innovate outside the traditional defense prime model.

Luckey reveals that Anduril prioritized institutional engagement over engineering in its early days, initially hiring more lawyers and lobbyists. The biggest challenge wasn't building the technology, but convincing the Department of Defense and political stakeholders to believe in a new procurement model, proving that shaping the system is a prerequisite for success.

The government's procurement process often defaults to bidding out projects to established players like Lockheed Martin, even if a startup presents a breakthrough. Success requires navigating this bureaucratic reality, not just superior engineering.

The push to build defense systems in America reveals that critical sub-components, like rocket motors or high-powered amplifiers, are no longer manufactured domestically at scale. This forces new defense companies to vertically integrate and build their own factories, essentially rebuilding parts of the industrial base themselves.

For its American Dynamism fund, Andreessen Horowitz provides more than capital; it fields a dedicated policy team in Washington D.C. This team works to change structural government problems, like defense procurement, creating a more favorable market for its portfolio and the broader startup ecosystem.

The Under Secretary of War's primary job is not just to fund technology, but to actively cultivate an ecosystem of new defense contractors. The stated goal is to create five more major companies capable of challenging established primes like Lockheed Martin, fostering competition and bringing new capabilities into the defense sector.

The defense tech sector is experiencing a perfect storm. This 'golden triangle' consists of: 1) Desperate customers in the Pentagon and Congress seeking innovation, 2) A wave of experienced founders graduating from successful firms like SpaceX and Anduril, and 3) Abundant downstream capital ready to fund growth.

Many defense startups fail despite superior technology because the government isn't ready to purchase at scale. Anduril's success hinges on identifying when the customer is ready to adopt new capabilities within a 3-5 year window, making market timing its most critical decision factor.

The go-to-market strategy for defense startups has evolved. While the first wave (e.g., Anduril) had to compete directly with incumbents, the 'Defense 2.0' cohort can grow much faster. They act as suppliers and partners to legacy prime contractors, who are now actively seeking to integrate their advanced technology.