The government's procurement process often defaults to bidding out projects to established players like Lockheed Martin, even if a startup presents a breakthrough. Success requires navigating this bureaucratic reality, not just superior engineering.
Prepared tackled the slow GovTech market by providing its initial product for free. This strategy bypassed cumbersome procurement, built a large user base, and established the credibility needed to overcome the authority of entrenched, larger competitors.
The conflict in Ukraine exposed the vulnerability of expensive, "exquisite" military platforms (like tanks) to inexpensive technologies (like drones). This has shifted defense priorities toward cheap, mass-producible, "attritable" systems. This fundamental change in product and economics creates a massive opportunity for startups to innovate outside the traditional defense prime model.
Startups often fail to displace incumbents because they become successful 'point solutions' and get acquired. The harder path to a much larger outcome is to build the entire integrated stack from the start, but initially serve a simpler, down-market customer segment before moving up.
Prepared realized it couldn't win against GovTech incumbents on their terms of sales relationships and lobbying. Their strategy was to fundamentally shift the competition. By offering a free, easy-to-use product, they forced the purchasing decision to be about technology quality, an arena where they could excel.
Startups often fail by making a slightly better version of an incumbent's product. This is a losing strategy because the incumbent can easily adapt. The key is to build something so fundamentally different in structure that competitors have a very hard time copying it, ensuring a durable advantage.
Luckey reveals that Anduril prioritized institutional engagement over engineering in its early days, initially hiring more lawyers and lobbyists. The biggest challenge wasn't building the technology, but convincing the Department of Defense and political stakeholders to believe in a new procurement model, proving that shaping the system is a prerequisite for success.
A major software vendor pitched a $50M deal directly to the DOE Chief of Staff, assuming top-level access was a shortcut. The pitch failed because they hadn't validated the need or built internal champions. High-level meetings are useless without foundational sales work proving a real problem exists for the organization.
Unlike traditional tech, founders in the American Dynamism space often succeed because of their deep, first-hand understanding of the customer (e.g., government, military). Many have prior service, hold security clearances, or have sold to government before. This "customer intimacy" allows them to speak the language and navigate complex procurement, a crucial advantage.
Marketing a defense company is fundamentally different from marketing a consumer product. Instead of a broad "one-to-all" campaign targeting millions of customers, defense marketing is a "one-to-few," hyper-targeted effort aimed at a small group of influential government decision-makers who could all fit in a single conference room.
Ken Griffin warns startups against direct, head-on competition with industry giants, stating, "you're going to lose." To succeed, you must find an asymmetrical advantage—operating "under the radar" or solving niche problems incumbents ignore. Citadel initially did this by hiring unconventional quantitative talent.