The Department of Defense is moving from rigid, program-specific contracts to a portfolio model. New Portfolio Acquisition Executives can now reallocate funds from underperforming projects to more promising startups mid-stream, rewarding agility and results over incumbency.

Luckey reveals that Anduril prioritized institutional engagement over engineering in its early days, initially hiring more lawyers and lobbyists. The biggest challenge wasn't building the technology, but convincing the Department of Defense and political stakeholders to believe in a new procurement model, proving that shaping the system is a prerequisite for success.

The government's procurement process often defaults to bidding out projects to established players like Lockheed Martin, even if a startup presents a breakthrough. Success requires navigating this bureaucratic reality, not just superior engineering.

Treat government programs as experiments. Define success metrics upfront and set a firm deadline. If the program fails to achieve its stated goals by that date, it should be automatically disbanded rather than being given more funding. This enforces accountability.

A major upcoming change in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) is the removal of "past performance" as a key criterion in procurement. This rule has historically favored large, incumbent defense contractors over innovative startups. Eliminating it allows new companies to compete on the merits of their technology, representing a significant unlock for the entire defense tech ecosystem.

Unlike traditional contractors paid for time and materials, Anduril invests its own capital to develop products first. This 'defense product company' model aligns incentives with the government's need for speed and effectiveness, as profits are tied to rapid, successful delivery, not prolonged development cycles.

Anduril advocates for performance-based contracts, a controversial model in government where payment is contingent on the product working. This forces internal accountability and aligns their interests with the customer's, contrasting with traditional cost-plus models that place all risk on the government.

Challenging the myth of slow government procurement, the Department of Energy completed an eight-figure software deal with a brand new vendor in just five weeks. This speed was possible because the vendor presented a strong ROI and a solution to an urgent, high-level problem, proving that bureaucracy can move fast for clear priorities.

The defense procurement system was built when technology platforms lasted for decades, prioritizing getting it perfect over getting it fast. This risk-averse model is now a liability in an era of rapid innovation, as it stifles the experimentation and failure necessary for speed.