Contrary to the typical anti-war sentiment in the West, anecdotal evidence suggests that an overwhelming majority of Iranians who oppose the regime—perhaps 80% or more—would welcome outside help. They feel abandoned after the US promised support for protesters, making them receptive to foreign intervention.

The idea that airstrikes can decapitate the Iranian regime is a fallacy. The IRGC's influence is too deeply embedded within the society and its institutions. Killing leaders at the top will not remove this "rot," and the IRGC will simply re-constitute control, likely in an even more repressive form.

The bombing campaign, aimed at regime change, could be counterproductive. Prior to the conflict, Iran's regime was seen as unpopular and frail, potentially heading for collapse or moderation. The external attack risks creating a rally-round-the-flag effect, allowing the regime to consolidate power where mere survival becomes a victory.

A clean, external removal of Iran's leadership, similar to what occurred in Venezuela, is unlikely. Iran's population is nearly four times larger, it is geographically distant, and the American political psyche associates the Middle East with costly military entanglements, creating a much higher barrier to intervention.

Advocates for regime change in Iran ignore the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan. Destroying the existing regime is far easier than building a new, stable government. The US has a poor track record, spending trillions and thousands of lives in similar efforts only to see the original powers, like the Taliban, return.

The hope that airstrikes can catalyze a popular uprising for regime change is historically unfounded. Unlike in Afghanistan or Libya where local ground forces existed, there is no organized army on the ground in Iran to capitalize on air power, making a decapitation strategy highly unlikely to succeed.

Despite widespread discontent, the Iranian opposition is leaderless, disorganized, and lacks a clear plan for seizing power. A successful revolution would require external military support to neutralize the regime's security forces, such as the Basij militia, and guide the effort.

A U.S. military strike to remove Ayatollah Khamenei is unlikely to help protesters. Analysis suggests it would more likely result in the Revolutionary Guard seizing control or other regime remnants continuing the fight, ultimately failing to satisfy the opposition and potentially worsening the civil conflict.

The US approach to Iran is not traditional regime change with ground troops. Instead, it involves targeted strikes to eliminate key leaders ("decapitation"), creating a power vacuum with the hope that the already revolutionary-minded Iranian public will topple the government from within.