The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has eclipsed the clergy, controlling major political and economic institutions. Ayatollah Khamenei maintains power through a symbiotic relationship with the IRGC, leveraging their military and economic might, rather than just religious authority.

The bombing campaign, aimed at regime change, could be counterproductive. Prior to the conflict, Iran's regime was seen as unpopular and frail, potentially heading for collapse or moderation. The external attack risks creating a rally-round-the-flag effect, allowing the regime to consolidate power where mere survival becomes a victory.

Unlike regimes centered on a single dictator like Saddam Hussein, Iran's power structure is a complex, institutionalized relationship between its clerical and military establishments. This distributed power makes the regime resilient to 'decapitation' strikes aimed at killing senior leaders, as there is no single point of failure.

The Trump administration's apparent strategy of decapitating leadership to find a compliant successor is unlikely to work in Iran. Unlike Venezuela, Iran's power is deeply institutionalized, it lacks an obvious cooperative figure, and potential US targets for that role have already been eliminated.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Iran's most powerful institution, is the true kingmaker. A Supreme Leader without the IRGC's backing is effectively powerless, regardless of constitutional or religious standing. This makes any assassination of the leader a less effective strategy for regime change.

Iran has anticipated leadership decapitation strikes for decades, building a resilient and distributed command and control infrastructure. This allows its forces, particularly the IRGC, to continue operating and launching attacks even without direct contact with headquarters.

The hope that airstrikes can catalyze a popular uprising for regime change is historically unfounded. Unlike in Afghanistan or Libya where local ground forces existed, there is no organized army on the ground in Iran to capitalize on air power, making a decapitation strategy highly unlikely to succeed.

A U.S. military strike to remove Ayatollah Khamenei is unlikely to help protesters. Analysis suggests it would more likely result in the Revolutionary Guard seizing control or other regime remnants continuing the fight, ultimately failing to satisfy the opposition and potentially worsening the civil conflict.

Iran's military is split into 31 provincial commands with pre-authorized launch orders. This structure makes it resilient to leadership assassinations, as there's no central "kill switch," complicating any military exit strategy for opposing forces.