The Houthis' lack of involvement in the initial conflict is a deliberate Iranian strategy. Iran is preserving them as a key asset in its "back pocket" to be used later for greater leverage, such as escalating the conflict by threatening maritime security in the Red Sea.
Despite widespread discontent, the Iranian opposition is leaderless, disorganized, and lacks a clear plan for seizing power. A successful revolution would require external military support to neutralize the regime's security forces, such as the Basij militia, and guide the effort.
The IRGC increasingly wields the true power in Iran, while the Supreme Leader's role is becoming more symbolic. He serves as a "sacred totem" and a "lightning rod for criticism" but is ultimately a facilitator of IRGC influence rather than a check on its power.
The transition to Mojtaba Khamenei represents a generational shift, not just a succession. It is the beginning of a process where younger officials—who experienced the regime's rise but missed its rewards—are taking control. This "coup" is more of a gradual replacement than a sudden seizure of power.
Destroying Iran's conventional military without toppling the regime could create a cornered, vengeful state. Lacking other options and led by a leader whose father was just killed, it might turn to asymmetric warfare like terrorism to retaliate for its humiliation and losses.
Iran's attacks on Gulf states are a calculated strategy to distribute the conflict's costs. By disrupting commerce, tourism, and daily life across the region, Tehran hopes to generate enough pressure from Gulf leaders on the US to end the war with security guarantees for Iran.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Iran's most powerful institution, is the true kingmaker. A Supreme Leader without the IRGC's backing is effectively powerless, regardless of constitutional or religious standing. This makes any assassination of the leader a less effective strategy for regime change.
Beyond being the IRGC's favored candidate, Mojtaba Khamenei's selection was pragmatic. As his father's right-hand man, he intimately understands the complex business and institutional mechanics of the Supreme Leader's office, allowing him to "hit the ground running" during a crisis.
Feeling exposed by a US they perceive as prioritizing Israel's defense, Gulf states are pursuing a "portfolio approach" to security. This involves creating smaller, multi-country defense pacts with nations like Pakistan, Turkey, and South Korea to build resilience beyond their traditional alliance with Washington.
The primary concern for Gulf nations is the "day after" a US-led conflict. They fear a scenario where the US declares victory and departs, leaving them to deal with a weakened but still dangerous and vengeful Iranian regime, similar to Saddam Hussein's Iraq after 1991.
Although the UAE acts as Iran's "economic lung," it is hesitant to freeze Iranian assets. Such a move would compromise its carefully cultivated global reputation as a neutral and safe hub for commerce and investment, potentially deterring other international actors from doing business there.
Gulf nations do not simply align with Israel against Iran. They perceive Israel's increasing military aggression as a destabilizing force, just as they do Iran's actions. They feel caught between two dangerous and unpredictable actors, with both threatening their national interests and economic diversification plans.