Contrary to the typical anti-war sentiment in the West, anecdotal evidence suggests that an overwhelming majority of Iranians who oppose the regime—perhaps 80% or more—would welcome outside help. They feel abandoned after the US promised support for protesters, making them receptive to foreign intervention.

Despite widespread protests, Iran's repressive state apparatus is highly effective and has shown no signs of cracking. The probability of the regime collapsing from internal pressure alone is extremely low. Niall Ferguson argues that only external intervention, a form of 'regime alteration,' can realistically topple the Islamic Republic.

Widespread suffering alone doesn't trigger a revolution. Historically, successful uprisings require a politically savvy, well-organized group with a clear agenda and influential leadership. Disparate and unorganized populations, no matter how desperate, tend to see their energy dissipate without causing systemic change.

The Trump administration's apparent strategy of decapitating leadership to find a compliant successor is unlikely to work in Iran. Unlike Venezuela, Iran's power is deeply institutionalized, it lacks an obvious cooperative figure, and potential US targets for that role have already been eliminated.

A clean, external removal of Iran's leadership, similar to what occurred in Venezuela, is unlikely. Iran's population is nearly four times larger, it is geographically distant, and the American political psyche associates the Middle East with costly military entanglements, creating a much higher barrier to intervention.

Reza Pahlavi's strategy is not based on domestic uprising alone. He believes protestors are "sacrificial lambs" who cannot succeed without direct American military intervention, framing them as a "fort waiting for the cavalry." This dependence makes his plan vulnerable to US political shifts.

The hope that airstrikes can catalyze a popular uprising for regime change is historically unfounded. Unlike in Afghanistan or Libya where local ground forces existed, there is no organized army on the ground in Iran to capitalize on air power, making a decapitation strategy highly unlikely to succeed.

A U.S. military strike to remove Ayatollah Khamenei is unlikely to help protesters. Analysis suggests it would more likely result in the Revolutionary Guard seizing control or other regime remnants continuing the fight, ultimately failing to satisfy the opposition and potentially worsening the civil conflict.

Despite widespread internal protests and instability, history shows that an external attack is one of the few things that can unify the Iranian population. A potential Israeli strike, meant to weaken the regime, could backfire by creating a 'rally 'round the flag' effect that shores up support for the Ayatollah.