After deposing a leader, the success of a foreign intervention hinges on whether the nation retains enough competent bureaucrats, engineers, and judges with experience in a functioning, democratic society to rebuild. Without this institutional memory, the state will likely collapse into chaos.

The U.S. action in Venezuela should be viewed as 'regime alteration.' Unlike the failed Iraq strategy of dismantling a state, this was a targeted move to swap a leader aligned with China and Russia for one answerable to the U.S. It’s a pragmatic assertion of influence, not an idealistic attempt at democratization.

The US stopped its ground offensive in Iraq after 100 hours, short of toppling Saddam Hussein. This was because the Soviet Union drew a red line: no regime change. Preserving Gorbachev's cooperation to finalize the end of the Cold War was the primary strategic goal, superseding objectives in Iraq.

The "absolutely clinical" US raid to capture Venezuela's president is lauded as a military success. However, historical precedents from Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 show that initial military prowess in toppling a regime is no guarantee of long-term strategic success, which depends on far more complex political factors.

Ukraine's most realistic theory of success is not reclaiming all territory militarily, but leveraging its advantages to stabilize the front and inflict unsustainable casualties and economic costs on Russia. This strategy aims to make the war so futile for Moscow that it forces a favorable negotiated settlement.

The hope that airstrikes can catalyze a popular uprising for regime change is historically unfounded. Unlike in Afghanistan or Libya where local ground forces existed, there is no organized army on the ground in Iran to capitalize on air power, making a decapitation strategy highly unlikely to succeed.

The US action to remove Maduro was not a traditional regime change. The goal was to eliminate the leader personally while leaving his party and government apparatus largely intact, suggesting a strategic choice to avoid the instability of a full power vacuum.

Ukraine should aim to become the 'South Korea' of Europe. This means accepting a negotiated peace or armistice that secures its independence and sovereignty over most of its territory, even if it doesn't reclaim everything. It can then rebuild into a prosperous democracy, creating a stark contrast with a decaying Russia.

Despite rhetoric supporting protesters in Iran and Venezuela, the Trump administration's actions suggest a preference for replacing existing leaders with more compliant strongmen. In Venezuela, this meant dealing with Maduro's VP, indicating a pragmatic focus on control and stability over messy, long-term nation-building.