The US action to remove Maduro was not a traditional regime change. The goal was to eliminate the leader personally while leaving his party and government apparatus largely intact, suggesting a strategic choice to avoid the instability of a full power vacuum.
The successful removal of Maduro is a significant failure for Cuban intelligence services, which have a long history of protecting allied regimes in Latin America. For decades, Cuba has 'punched above its weight,' providing a security shield to leaders like Maduro. This event raises questions about the decline of their once-feared capabilities.
The removal of Maduro was a technological showcase, employing cyber tools to knock out power and air defenses, communications jamming, and suicide drones. This demonstrates a significant evolution in U.S. military capabilities beyond conventional special operations.
The raid on Maduro is presented as an opportunity for special forces units to demonstrate their value to an administration wary of large, troop-intensive occupations. This "surgical strike" model offers a politically palatable alternative to the costly nation-building efforts of the 2000s in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The U.S. operation to capture Maduro serves as a real-world case study for China's potential 'decapitation' strike against Taiwan. China has already rehearsed such scenarios in mock-ups of Taipei's presidential palace. This event demonstrates the feasibility of a quick, surgical strike, which is more aligned with the CCP's goals than a costly amphibious invasion.
The Trump administration is depicted as ignoring Venezuela's legitimately elected opposition leader and instead choosing to work with the former vice president. This suggests a strategy prioritizing controllable stability with a regime figure over supporting a democratically elected but potentially less predictable leader.
Despite the public focus on oil, the primary goal of removing Maduro was likely to demonstrate U.S. primacy in the Western Hemisphere. The action serves as a strong signal that the U.S. is willing to act aggressively to enforce its influence in the region.
Venezuela's remaining leadership can adopt a strategy of "playing for time." By appearing cooperative while delaying substantive changes, they can wait for events like the US midterms to increase domestic political pressure on the administration, making sustained intervention unpopular and difficult to maintain. The weaker state's best defense is the superpower's internal clock.
The US has established a precedent of using military force to apprehend fugitives abroad based on domestic legal actions, as seen with Noriega in 1989 and Maduro now. This practice blurs the line between law enforcement and an act of war, creating a thin legal justification for military intervention without traditional congressional or international approval.
The "absolutely clinical" US raid to capture Venezuela's president is lauded as a military success. However, historical precedents from Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 show that initial military prowess in toppling a regime is no guarantee of long-term strategic success, which depends on far more complex political factors.
The conflict is not primarily about oil or drugs, but a strategic move to reassert U.S. dominance in the Western Hemisphere. As China solidifies its influence in the East, the U.S. is 'drawing a line' to counter China's partnerships (like with Venezuela) in its own sphere of influence.