The "absolutely clinical" US raid to capture Venezuela's president is lauded as a military success. However, historical precedents from Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 show that initial military prowess in toppling a regime is no guarantee of long-term strategic success, which depends on far more complex political factors.
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Policymakers instinctively rely on historical analogies. While powerful, this reliance is dangerous when based on simplistic or false comparisons like 'another Munich' or 'another Vietnam.' This makes rigorous, nuanced historical perspective essential to avoid repeating past mistakes driven by flawed parallels.
The raid on Maduro is presented as an opportunity for special forces units to demonstrate their value to an administration wary of large, troop-intensive occupations. This "surgical strike" model offers a politically palatable alternative to the costly nation-building efforts of the 2000s in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The Trump administration is depicted as ignoring Venezuela's legitimately elected opposition leader and instead choosing to work with the former vice president. This suggests a strategy prioritizing controllable stability with a regime figure over supporting a democratically elected but potentially less predictable leader.
Grant was a brilliant Civil War general because his skills perfectly matched the desperate need for military commanders. However, he was a mediocre president because he meshed poorly with the political environment of the White House. This highlights that leadership skills are not universally transferable; context is everything.
Venezuela's remaining leadership can adopt a strategy of "playing for time." By appearing cooperative while delaying substantive changes, they can wait for events like the US midterms to increase domestic political pressure on the administration, making sustained intervention unpopular and difficult to maintain. The weaker state's best defense is the superpower's internal clock.
The US stopped its ground offensive in Iraq after 100 hours, short of toppling Saddam Hussein. This was because the Soviet Union drew a red line: no regime change. Preserving Gorbachev's cooperation to finalize the end of the Cold War was the primary strategic goal, superseding objectives in Iraq.
The failure of Western nation-building highlights a key principle: establishing durable institutions must precede the promotion of democratic ideals. Without strong institutional frameworks for order, ideals like "freedom" can lead to chaos. America’s own success was built on inherited institutions, a luxury many developing nations lack, making the export of democracy exceptionally difficult.
Contrary to the assumption that U.S. military action is unwelcome in the region, polling reveals significant support. 53% of Latin Americans and 64% of the Venezuelan diaspora would back an intervention to remove Nicolas Maduro, highlighting a major disconnect with the skepticism of the American public.
Dara Khosrowshahi theorizes the Shah of Iran's regime collapsed because he modernized too fast, focused excessively on military power over industrial growth, and failed to bring along rural populations and integrate Islam into his vision, creating a power vacuum for the Islamic regime to exploit.
When complex situations are reduced to a single metric, strategy shifts from achieving the original goal to maximizing the metric itself. During the Vietnam War, using "body counts" as a proxy for success led to military decisions designed to increase casualties, not to win the war.
