After deposing a leader, the success of a foreign intervention hinges on whether the nation retains enough competent bureaucrats, engineers, and judges with experience in a functioning, democratic society to rebuild. Without this institutional memory, the state will likely collapse into chaos.
Related Insights
While societal decline can be a long, slow process, it can unravel rapidly. The tipping point is when the outside world loses confidence in a nation's core institutions, such as its legal system or central bank. This triggers a sudden flight of capital, talent, and investment, drastically accelerating the collapse.
Much of government functions on decorum and unwritten rules. When political actors attack these norms—like challenging procedural traditions—it creates a cycle of retribution that destabilizes the entire system more profoundly than any single illegal act could.
Authoritarian leaders like Hugo Chavez systematically dismantle democracy from within after winning elections. They replace competent individuals in the military and government with those who are absolutely loyal, destroying meritocracy to ensure the state apparatus serves the regime, not the people.
The "absolutely clinical" US raid to capture Venezuela's president is lauded as a military success. However, historical precedents from Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 show that initial military prowess in toppling a regime is no guarantee of long-term strategic success, which depends on far more complex political factors.
The failure of Western nation-building highlights a key principle: establishing durable institutions must precede the promotion of democratic ideals. Without strong institutional frameworks for order, ideals like "freedom" can lead to chaos. America’s own success was built on inherited institutions, a luxury many developing nations lack, making the export of democracy exceptionally difficult.
Once a country falls into the unstable “anocracy” zone, its chances of recovery are slim, with only 20% returning to a full democracy. Data shows this reversal, or "U-turn," must happen quickly, typically within a single electoral cycle of five to eight years. The longer a nation lingers, the harder it is to escape.
The US action to remove Maduro was not a traditional regime change. The goal was to eliminate the leader personally while leaving his party and government apparatus largely intact, suggesting a strategic choice to avoid the instability of a full power vacuum.
The belief that China builds fast only because it's a dictatorship is flawed. Democratic America built a B-24 bomber every hour during WWII, while today it struggles with basic infrastructure. This shows that bureaucratic decay, not the form of government, is the true barrier to rapid execution.
By leaving the existing Chavista power structure largely intact after removing Maduro, the U.S. is applying a key lesson from Iraq: avoiding a power vacuum and the chaos of de-Ba'athification is paramount for stability.
A CIA task force analyzed 38 variables to predict political instability, including common assumptions like poverty and inequality. They found only two were highly predictive: 1) a country being a partial democracy, or “anocracy,” and 2) its political parties organizing around identity (race, religion) rather than ideology.