After deposing a leader, the success of a foreign intervention hinges on whether the nation retains enough competent bureaucrats, engineers, and judges with experience in a functioning, democratic society to rebuild. Without this institutional memory, the state will likely collapse into chaos.
For generations, Western societies have viewed peace and prosperity as the default state. This perception is a historical outlier, making the return to 'dog eat dog' great power politics seem shocking, when in fact it's a reversion to the historical norm of conflict.
China's ascent to a peer competitor wasn't through tanks and missiles. It used factories, ports, and loans to build global influence and absorb technology, capital, and leverage, particularly while the US was distracted by wars in the Middle East.
The US invasion of Venezuela isn't for oil or to stop drugs, but to counter China's strategic influence via its Belt and Road Initiative. This reasserts the Monroe Doctrine—preventing rival footholds in its hemisphere—in a new Cold War context.
Citing a historical pattern, the speaker notes that 12 out of the last 16 times a rising power (like China) has confronted a ruling power (like the US), the result has been war. This 'Thucydides Trap' suggests a high statistical probability of military conflict.
Beyond strategic ports, China's maneuvering includes creating financial infrastructure, like a South American gold corridor, as part of a larger strategy to establish a gold-backed currency that could rival and undermine the US dollar's status as the world's reserve currency.