Traditional defense contractors use a "cost-plus" model, earning a percentage of total costs, which incentivizes inefficiency. Anduril sells products at a fixed price, aligning its success with saving the government and taxpayers money.

To combat inefficiency, the Pentagon is moving away from paying contractors for time and materials ('cost-plus'). The new model emphasizes business-oriented, fixed-price contracts where companies are paid upon successful, on-time delivery of a working product, introducing more risk and profit incentive for vendors.

The problem with large defense contractors isn't the companies themselves but an acquisition system that awards contracts before a product is built. This shifts all development risk to the government. The solution is to force companies to invest their own risk capital first.

Legacy defense contractors on "cost-plus" models are incentivized to increase costs to boost profits. This is the opposite of the startup model, which must innovate to deliver superior products faster and cheaper to gain market share, injecting much-needed competition into the sector.

Unlike traditional contractors paid for time and materials, Anduril invests its own capital to develop products first. This 'defense product company' model aligns incentives with the government's need for speed and effectiveness, as profits are tied to rapid, successful delivery, not prolonged development cycles.

Military and government leaders are penalized more for failing to spend their entire budget than for being inefficient. This perverse incentive system ensures all funds are used, even on unnecessary programs, to secure future funding.

Anduril advocates for performance-based contracts, a controversial model in government where payment is contingent on the product working. This forces internal accountability and aligns their interests with the customer's, contrasting with traditional cost-plus models that place all risk on the government.

The standard "cost-plus" model guarantees contractors a profit margin on top of their expenses. This creates a perverse incentive to maximize costs and timelines, as 10% of a $3 billion project is far more lucrative than 10% of a $150 million one.

The "cost-plus" regulatory model allows utilities to earn a guaranteed return on capital investments (CAPEX) but no margin on operational expenses (OPEX). This creates a powerful, often inefficient, incentive for utilities to solve every problem by building expensive new infrastructure, even when cheaper operational solutions exist.