Contrary to its national narrative, a unified China is a rare exception. Its 3,000-year history is dominated by 29 civilizational collapses where the central state fails, warlords rise, and the population plummets. Unity is not its natural state.

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Unlike China's vast, easily unified plains, Europe's geography of mountains and rivers created natural barriers. This prevented a single empire from dominating and instead fostered centuries of intense competition between states. This constant conflict spurred rapid technological and military innovation, ultimately leading to European dominance.

Observing the USSR's fall, the Chinese Communist Party drew key lessons to ensure its survival: use overwhelming force against dissent, prioritize the Party's power monopoly even at the cost of economic efficiency, and aggressively assimilate ethnic minorities to prevent separatism.

The dynamic between a rising power (China) and a ruling one (the U.S.) fits the historical pattern of the "Thucydides' trap." In 12 of the last 16 instances of this scenario, the confrontation has ended in open war, suggesting that a peaceful resolution is the exception, not the rule.

For generations, Western societies have viewed peace and prosperity as the default state. This perception is a historical outlier, making the return to 'dog eat dog' great power politics seem shocking, when in fact it's a reversion to the historical norm of conflict.

Statisticians now believe local Chinese governments have lied about demographics for over 25 years. The realization came from plummeting tax receipts, suggesting millions of children thought born in the late 90s never existed. The country's population may be overstated by 100-300 million people, accelerating its collapse.

China’s geography creates three distinct population centers (North, Shanghai, South). These regions have separate identities and have often integrated more with global trade than with each other, making political unity a fragile, imposed state rather than an organic one.

China is structurally incapable of displacing the U.S. due to a trio of critical weaknesses: Xi Jinping's consolidation of power has paralyzed decision-making, geography boxes in its military, and an irreversible demographic crisis signals imminent collapse.

The core national anxieties of Russia and China are opposites, shaping their strategic cultures. Russia's history of devastating invasions fuels its fear of external threats (the "Mongol yoke"). China, haunted by centuries of civil war, fears internal chaos and the collapse of the state above all else.

Viewing China as a "rising" power is incorrect; it's a "reascending" one. For 70% of the years since 1500, China had the world's largest GDP. Its current trajectory is a return to its historical dominance, a framing that fundamentally alters the understanding of its global ambitions.

Current instability is not unique to one country but part of a global pattern. This mirrors historical "crisis centuries" (like the 17th) where civil wars, plagues, and economic turmoil occurred simultaneously across different civilizations, driven by similar underlying variables.