Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, Russia consistently manipulated China during its moments of weakness. It offered "mediation" in conflicts like the Opium Wars that ultimately served Russian interests by keeping China destabilized and forcing it to cede territory.
Both nations use nationalism to rally support and distract from domestic failings. But this approach is a "heady drink" with severe downsides: it repels internal minorities, pushes neighbors to form counter-alliances, and makes it politically difficult to de-escalate international crises.
The popular image of a strong, friendly Sino-Soviet bond originated with the 1919 Karahan Manifesto, where Bolsheviks promised to return lands seized by the Tsars. They later reneged on this promise, but the propaganda successfully masked Russia's own continued imperial ambitions in China.
Historically, Russia and China's strategy as continental empires involves avoiding two-front wars and actively destabilizing neighboring states. This creates buffer zones and prevents any single power from becoming a threat on their borders, ensuring their own security through regional instability.
Russia portrays NATO's growth as an aggressive act of encirclement. This narrative, however, ignores that Eastern European nations eagerly joined NATO for protection, driven by Russia's long and brutal history of posing an existential threat to its neighbors. The expansion was defensive, not offensive.
Fearing a joint German-Japanese attack in the 1930s, Stalin used his influence to force Chinese Nationalists and Communists into a united front. This provoked Japan into a massive, costly invasion of China in 1937, tying down Japanese forces so they could not threaten the Soviet Union.
To control Eastern Europe after WWII, the Soviets used a replicable playbook. They seized control of defense, interior, and justice ministries to monopolize coercion and information, while using land reform to eliminate old elites and create dependency, all under the fiction of democracy.
In the final weeks of WWII, the Soviet Union invaded Manchuria and dismantled its industrial infrastructure, shipping home the vast majority of its power, mining, and metalworking equipment. This industrial base should have gone to China, which had fought Japan for 15 years, not Russia.
Observing the USSR's fall, the Chinese Communist Party drew key lessons to ensure its survival: use overwhelming force against dissent, prioritize the Party's power monopoly even at the cost of economic efficiency, and aggressively assimilate ethnic minorities to prevent separatism.
The core national anxieties of Russia and China are opposites, shaping their strategic cultures. Russia's history of devastating invasions fuels its fear of external threats (the "Mongol yoke"). China, haunted by centuries of civil war, fears internal chaos and the collapse of the state above all else.
Soviet leaders who lived through WWII understood the unpredictability of direct conflict and preferred proxy wars. Vladimir Putin, in contrast, has consistently used direct "hot wars"—from Chechnya to Georgia to Ukraine—as a primary tool to consolidate power and boost his domestic popularity.
Once Chinese intervention in the Korean War created a stalemate, Stalin saw the conflict as a perfect opportunity. He believed it would drain American resources and delay China's rise, all while keeping Russia out of direct conflict—a low-risk, high-reward strategy of "fighting to the last Chinese."