For generations, Western societies have viewed peace and prosperity as the default state. This perception is a historical outlier, making the return to 'dog eat dog' great power politics seem shocking, when in fact it's a reversion to the historical norm of conflict.
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The current era of multipolarity, global economic integration, and tensions between rising and incumbent powers (like China and the US) is more analogous to the early 20th century before WWI than the bipolar Cold War. This historical parallel carries stark warnings about the potential for conflict.
The dynamic between a rising power (China) and a ruling one (the U.S.) fits the historical pattern of the "Thucydides' trap." In 12 of the last 16 instances of this scenario, the confrontation has ended in open war, suggesting that a peaceful resolution is the exception, not the rule.
The current environment mirrors the late 19th century's first wave of globalization. Then, as now, rapid technological change concentrated wealth, fueling populism and nationalism that ultimately led to global conflict in 1914. We risk 'sleepwalking' into a similar catastrophe.
Citing a historical pattern, the speaker notes that 12 out of the last 16 times a rising power (like China) has confronted a ruling power (like the US), the result has been war. This 'Thucydides Trap' suggests a high statistical probability of military conflict.
The era of economic-led globalization is over. In the new world order, geopolitical interests are the primary driver of international relations. Economic instruments like tariffs and export restrictions are now used as levers to assert national interests, a fundamental shift from the US-centric view where the economy traditionally took the lead.
The post-Cold War era of stability is over. The world is returning to an 'Old Normal' where great power conflict plays out in the economic arena. This new state is defined by fiscal dominance, weaponized supply chains, and structurally higher inflation, risk premia, and volatility.
Viewing China as a "rising" power is incorrect; it's a "reascending" one. For 70% of the years since 1500, China had the world's largest GDP. Its current trajectory is a return to its historical dominance, a framing that fundamentally alters the understanding of its global ambitions.
Current instability is not unique to one country but part of a global pattern. This mirrors historical "crisis centuries" (like the 17th) where civil wars, plagues, and economic turmoil occurred simultaneously across different civilizations, driven by similar underlying variables.
The period from 1870-1914 mirrors today's super cycle of innovation, wealth concentration, inequality, populism, nationalism, and geopolitical rivalry. This makes it a more relevant historical parallel for understanding current risks than the recent era of hyper-globalization.
The recent uptick in global conflicts, from Ukraine to the Caribbean, is not a series of isolated events. It's a direct result of adversaries perceiving American weakness and acting on the historical principle that nations expand their influence until they are met with sufficient counter-force.
