After 1991, without the Soviet Union as a counterbalancing power, US foreign policy shifted from pragmatic containment to an interventionist, 'neocon' crusade. This ideology of a 'responsibility to protect' led to costly, destabilizing 'forever wars' in the Middle East, a departure from the more measured Cold War approach.
The 1990s belief that economic liberalization would inevitably make China democratic provided ideological cover for policies that fueled its growth. This hubris, combined with corporate greed, allowed the US to facilitate the rise of its greatest geopolitical rival without achieving the expected political reforms.
The US foreign policy establishment is not driven by partisan ideology but by strategic interests. It will fund contradictory groups—from right-wing Ukrainian nationalists to progressive artists—if they serve the immediate goal of destabilizing a region to secure economic or military advantages.
Luckey argues that US foreign policy is shifting away from direct military intervention. The new, more effective strategy is to arm allies, turning them into "prickly porcupines" that are difficult to attack. This approach maintains US influence and economic benefits while avoiding the political and human cost of deploying troops.
US agencies and NATO fund a network of NGOs that act as a cohesive "swarm." This swarm delivers threats of political instability or economic ruin to foreign leaders, effectively coercing them to align with US interests without direct government intervention.
Despite dismantling traditional aid programs to save taxpayer money, Trump's new strategy of bailing out allies, countering China, and securing supply chains is projected to be incredibly expensive. This new approach of weaponized aid could ultimately exceed previous USAID spending levels, contradicting its cost-saving premise.
In global conflicts, a nation's power dictates its actions and outcomes, not moral righteousness. History shows powerful nations, like the U.S. using nuclear weapons, operate beyond conventional moral constraints, making an understanding of power dynamics more critical than moralizing.
The US stopped its ground offensive in Iraq after 100 hours, short of toppling Saddam Hussein. This was because the Soviet Union drew a red line: no regime change. Preserving Gorbachev's cooperation to finalize the end of the Cold War was the primary strategic goal, superseding objectives in Iraq.
The post-Cold War era of stability is over. The world is returning to an 'Old Normal' where great power conflict plays out in the economic arena. This new state is defined by fiscal dominance, weaponized supply chains, and structurally higher inflation, risk premia, and volatility.
The latest U.S. National Security Strategy drops confrontational rhetoric about China as an ideological threat, instead framing the relationship around economic rivalry and rebalancing. This shift prioritizes tangible deals over promoting American values globally, marking a departure from Reagan-era foreign policy.
The recent uptick in global conflicts, from Ukraine to the Caribbean, is not a series of isolated events. It's a direct result of adversaries perceiving American weakness and acting on the historical principle that nations expand their influence until they are met with sufficient counter-force.