Once Chinese intervention in the Korean War created a stalemate, Stalin saw the conflict as a perfect opportunity. He believed it would drain American resources and delay China's rise, all while keeping Russia out of direct conflict—a low-risk, high-reward strategy of "fighting to the last Chinese."
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The dynamic between a rising power (China) and a ruling one (the U.S.) fits the historical pattern of the "Thucydides' trap." In 12 of the last 16 instances of this scenario, the confrontation has ended in open war, suggesting that a peaceful resolution is the exception, not the rule.
Historically, Russia and China's strategy as continental empires involves avoiding two-front wars and actively destabilizing neighboring states. This creates buffer zones and prevents any single power from becoming a threat on their borders, ensuring their own security through regional instability.
Historically, rising and ruling powers don't stumble into war directly. Instead, their heightened distrust creates a tinderbox where a seemingly minor incident involving a third party (like the assassination in Sarajevo pre-WWI) can escalate uncontrollably into a catastrophic conflict.
While a unipolar world led by one's own country is advantageous, a multipolar world with competing powers like the U.S. and China creates a dynamic tension. This competition may force more compromised global decisions, potentially leading to a more balanced, albeit more tense, international system than one dominated by a single unchallenged power.
The popular image of a strong, friendly Sino-Soviet bond originated with the 1919 Karahan Manifesto, where Bolsheviks promised to return lands seized by the Tsars. They later reneged on this promise, but the propaganda successfully masked Russia's own continued imperial ambitions in China.
The core national anxieties of Russia and China are opposites, shaping their strategic cultures. Russia's history of devastating invasions fuels its fear of external threats (the "Mongol yoke"). China, haunted by centuries of civil war, fears internal chaos and the collapse of the state above all else.
Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, Russia consistently manipulated China during its moments of weakness. It offered "mediation" in conflicts like the Opium Wars that ultimately served Russian interests by keeping China destabilized and forcing it to cede territory.
Soviet leaders who lived through WWII understood the unpredictability of direct conflict and preferred proxy wars. Vladimir Putin, in contrast, has consistently used direct "hot wars"—from Chechnya to Georgia to Ukraine—as a primary tool to consolidate power and boost his domestic popularity.
Fearing a joint German-Japanese attack in the 1930s, Stalin used his influence to force Chinese Nationalists and Communists into a united front. This provoked Japan into a massive, costly invasion of China in 1937, tying down Japanese forces so they could not threaten the Soviet Union.
The recent uptick in global conflicts, from Ukraine to the Caribbean, is not a series of isolated events. It's a direct result of adversaries perceiving American weakness and acting on the historical principle that nations expand their influence until they are met with sufficient counter-force.
