The idea that airstrikes can decapitate the Iranian regime is a fallacy. The IRGC's influence is too deeply embedded within the society and its institutions. Killing leaders at the top will not remove this "rot," and the IRGC will simply re-constitute control, likely in an even more repressive form.

While the campaign successfully suppressed Iranian missile launches, it created a wounded, aggrieved regime. This political reality provides a powerful new incentive for Iran to double down on its nuclear program, meaning a tactical victory could directly lead to a long-term strategic catastrophe.

The bombing campaign, aimed at regime change, could be counterproductive. Prior to the conflict, Iran's regime was seen as unpopular and frail, potentially heading for collapse or moderation. The external attack risks creating a rally-round-the-flag effect, allowing the regime to consolidate power where mere survival becomes a victory.

The conflict did not empower Iran's opposition; it terrorized civilians and justified the installation of a military government. The regime used the war to intensify its crackdown on dissent, making the Iranian people and their democratic aspirations the primary casualties.

While US strikes weaken Iran's military, Trump's simultaneous focus on keeping oil markets stable allows Iran to sell its oil at a premium. This creates a contradictory outcome where Iran's economic leverage and funding for future aggression increase, even as its military is degraded.

The US presumed a 'decapitation strike' would cause the Iranian regime to collapse from internal mismanagement and popular unrest. This proved false, as the regime's institutionalization and resilience were severely underestimated, leading to a protracted conflict for Washington.

Counterintuitively, Iran's regime feels it has the upper hand in the war because the conflict has driven up oil prices. Even as its military sites are targeted, the country is earning more from oil exports than before the war, feeding its perception of strategic success.

Despite widespread internal protests and instability, history shows that an external attack is one of the few things that can unify the Iranian population. A potential Israeli strike, meant to weaken the regime, could backfire by creating a 'rally 'round the flag' effect that shores up support for the Ayatollah.

The war on Iran was a "war of choice" based on a flawed assumption of imminent regime collapse. Burns argues the Iranian regime is designed to withstand decapitation and predictably reacted by regionalizing the conflict to inflict economic and political pain on its adversaries.