Iran perceives the conflict not as a regional dispute but as a direct threat to its existence. Its strategy is to make the war so costly for adversaries that it secures long-term guarantees against future attacks, framing its actions through a lens of survival.

The idea that airstrikes can decapitate the Iranian regime is a fallacy. The IRGC's influence is too deeply embedded within the society and its institutions. Killing leaders at the top will not remove this "rot," and the IRGC will simply re-constitute control, likely in an even more repressive form.

The bombing campaign, aimed at regime change, could be counterproductive. Prior to the conflict, Iran's regime was seen as unpopular and frail, potentially heading for collapse or moderation. The external attack risks creating a rally-round-the-flag effect, allowing the regime to consolidate power where mere survival becomes a victory.

Unlike regimes centered on a single dictator like Saddam Hussein, Iran's power structure is a complex, institutionalized relationship between its clerical and military establishments. This distributed power makes the regime resilient to 'decapitation' strikes aimed at killing senior leaders, as there is no single point of failure.

Iran's strategy involves striking non-combatant US allies like the UAE and Saudi Arabia. This imposes broad regional pain, demonstrating to the world that the economic and political costs of attacking Iran will be too high for anyone to bear, thus restoring long-term deterrence.

Targeting senior leaders in regimes that operate on an irregular warfare model is a flawed strategy. These governments anticipate such attacks and have shadow leadership structures in place, ensuring operational continuity and rendering decapitation strikes futile.

The US administration believed it could decapitate Iran's leadership and install a friendly faction, replicating its 'Venezuela model.' This strategy collapsed in the opening hours of the war because the potential successors the US counted on were killed alongside the Supreme Leader.

Iran's military is split into 31 provincial commands with pre-authorized launch orders. This structure makes it resilient to leadership assassinations, as there's no central "kill switch," complicating any military exit strategy for opposing forces.

Before the conflict, Western consensus focused on Iran's nuclear ambitions. The war revealed that Iran had been systematically lying about its non-nuclear capabilities, such as long-range missile technology, which poses a significant and previously miscalculated threat to regional and Western interests.