The US military action against Iran lacks a clear off-ramp or stated goal, violating the Powell Doctrine. This ambiguity between objectives like "regime change" and other aims creates strategic confusion and risks prolonged engagement without a defined victory condition.

An act of aggression can become so popular domestically that leaders feel compelled to see it through, even if initially intended as a negotiating tactic. The Argentine junta found the Falklands invasion was "the most popular thing they'd ever done," trapping them in a conflict they couldn't easily abandon.

A population can be habituated to war through gradual escalation. By starting with seemingly small, contained "lightning strikes," each subsequent step feels less shocking. This incremental approach can lead a nation into a major conflict without a single decisive moment of public debate or consent.

The British WWII strategic bombing campaign reveals a core logic of war: success provokes a neutralizing reaction. As British bombing became more effective, Germany reallocated vast resources to air defense and countermeasures. This response ultimately negated the initial British advantage, showcasing the dynamic interplay of action and reaction.

The spectacular success of US military and intelligence operations, like the one against Maduro in Venezuela, can create a dangerous sense of hubris. Leaders may begin to see the military as a 'magic wand' for solving any problem, leading them to misapply this powerful tool in more complex situations like Iran.

The "absolutely clinical" US raid to capture Venezuela's president is lauded as a military success. However, historical precedents from Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 show that initial military prowess in toppling a regime is no guarantee of long-term strategic success, which depends on far more complex political factors.

Defining success as an ambitious, all-or-nothing outcome like 'regime change' is a critical mistake. Instead, administrations should set clear, measurable military objectives, such as degrading missile capabilities or naval threats. This allows them to define success, declare victory, and create a clear off-ramp for military campaigns.

Nations like the US and USSR prolong involvement in failed conflicts like Afghanistan primarily due to "reputational risk." The goal shifts from achieving the original mission to avoiding the perception of failure, creating an endless commitment where objectives continually morph.

The US and Israel are operationally successful in degrading Iran's military capabilities. However, leadership has failed to articulate a coherent strategic objective for the war, making it difficult to define victory or know when the conflict will end.