Modern militaries often define success by tactical objectives like destroying targets, rather than achieving broader political aims. This creates a dangerous gap where battlefield wins can lead to strategic losses, as seen in conflicts where the ultimate political objectives remained muddled and unachieved.

A leader facing a strategic defeat has a choice: accept the loss and its immediate political damage, or escalate militarily. Escalation, even if unlikely to succeed, delays the public reckoning and preserves a slim hope of victory, a phenomenon known as the "escalation trap."

Leaders and military planners consistently fall for the "short war fallacy" because planning for protracted conflicts is politically unpalatable and requires immense economic mobilization that societies are unwilling to undertake. The hope for a quick, decisive victory is an institutional bias.

The spectacular success of US military and intelligence operations, like the one against Maduro in Venezuela, can create a dangerous sense of hubris. Leaders may begin to see the military as a 'magic wand' for solving any problem, leading them to misapply this powerful tool in more complex situations like Iran.

A paradox exists in modern conflict: while technology like drones and sensors makes the battlefield incredibly lethal and difficult to operate on, political leaders remain optimistic about using war as a tool of statecraft. They consistently believe they can achieve a decisive victory despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary.

The US-Iran conflict cycle demonstrates that when neither side can achieve a decisive military or economic victory, and both are unwilling to compromise, the result is a protracted stalemate. Limited strikes and sanctions inflict pain but fail to force capitulation, leading to an endless loop of low-grade warfare and failed diplomacy.

Predicting the results of war is futile because no model can accurately account for human will. Just as it's impossible to know who will endure SEAL training, it's impossible for academics or strategists to know what a nation is willing to endure, making overconfident predictions a critical error.

Initial military actions, like successful bombings, can feel like victories. However, they often fail to solve the core political issue, trapping leaders into escalating the conflict further to achieve the original strategic goal, as they don't want to accept failure.

Jeffrey Goldberg critiques the casual, emoji-laden discourse from officials discussing military action. He argues that even when targeting terrorists, leaders must not "act like a fucking child" because killing people is not a video game. This solemn approach to lethal force is an increasingly lonely position.