The belief that China builds fast only because it's a dictatorship is flawed. Democratic America built a B-24 bomber every hour during WWII, while today it struggles with basic infrastructure. This shows that bureaucratic decay, not the form of government, is the true barrier to rapid execution.
The romantic notion that the US can rapidly pivot its industrial base for war is a misleading myth. Today's weapons are vastly more complex and reliant on fragile global supply chains for components that are controlled by adversaries, making a WWII-style industrial mobilization impossible without years of preparation.
A critical asymmetry exists in the US-China competition: It is far harder for the U.S. to rebuild its complex manufacturing ecosystems and tacit process knowledge than it is for China to improve its scientific research capabilities, where it is already making significant strides.
The US won World War II largely due to its unparalleled manufacturing capacity. Today, that strategic advantage has been ceded to China. In a potential conflict, the US would face an adversary that mirrors its own historical strength, creating a critical national security vulnerability.
The belief that China's manufacturing advantage is cheap labor is dangerously outdated. Its true dominance lies in a 20-year head start on manufacturing autonomy, with production for complex products like the PlayStation 5 being 90% automated. The US outsourced innovation instead of automating domestically.
China's immense state capacity allows for rapid infrastructure development but also enables disastrous national policies like the one-child policy or Zero-COVID. Unlike the deliberative U.S. system, China's efficiency means that when it goes off track, it can go catastrophically off track before any course correction is possible.
China operates as a high-agency "engineering state" that executes relentlessly on large-scale projects. In contrast, America's deliberative, litigious society often leads to endless delays and failures on major infrastructure goals like the California high-speed rail, highlighting a fundamental difference in state capacity and approach.
The U.S. has a historical engineering tradition it can revive to solve its building crisis. China, however, lacks a deep-rooted liberal or lawyerly tradition of constraining state power. This path dependency makes it far easier for America to become a better builder than for China to become more rights-respecting.
From the transcontinental railroad to the Apollo missions, the U.S. once had a powerful engineering culture that drove national progress. This identity has been lost, replaced by a lawyerly culture that prioritizes obstruction over construction, leading to decaying infrastructure and societal stagnation.
A nation's leadership class shapes its priorities. China's government, heavily populated by engineers, excels at long-term, systematic infrastructure and technology projects. The US, dominated by lawyers, often gets mired in litigation and short-term cycles, hindering large-scale execution.
China, led by engineers, treats national problems as megaprojects to be built. The U.S., dominated by lawyers, excels at blocking initiatives through legal challenges. This core difference explains why China can build rapidly while the U.S. struggles with infrastructure and progress.