Fiona Hill distinguishes between a stalemate, where neither side *can* move, and a deadlock, where they *refuse* to move. This framing suggests the Ukraine war isn't permanently frozen. A sudden concession, likely forced by external pressure on Putin from powers like China, could break the impasse unexpectedly.

The peace deal materialized only after President Trump became personally and seriously invested. His direct pressure on Prime Minister Netanyahu was the critical factor in shifting Israel's position, suggesting that previous, less forceful American approaches missed opportunities to end the conflict sooner.

The US needed a conflict that offered the 'appearance of victory' and could be quickly concluded. Israel's goals were more fundamental: ensuring it could never again face a surprise attack, implying a longer, more disruptive war. This misalignment created strategic tension between the allies.

A swift peace deal in Ukraine might not be the preferred outcome for all its European partners. Some may see a longer conflict as a strategic opportunity to bolster their own military capabilities while Russia is occupied.

Nations whose leadership faces an existential threat (e.g., being overthrown and killed) will not capitulate to standard economic or military pressure. Their only perceived path is to escalate and push forward, rendering traditional negotiation leverage ineffective.

Ukraine's most realistic theory of success is not reclaiming all territory militarily, but leveraging its advantages to stabilize the front and inflict unsustainable casualties and economic costs on Russia. This strategy aims to make the war so futile for Moscow that it forces a favorable negotiated settlement.

This strategy involves supplying Ukraine only with defensive systems (like air defense) during peacetime. Offensive capabilities (long-range missiles) would be stockpiled nearby and immediately provided if Russia violates the ceasefire, creating a powerful incentive for compliance.

Jake Sullivan, reflecting on the post-October 7th period, concludes that the Biden administration should have applied more pressure on the Israeli government to change its approach in Gaza. This marks a significant admission and signals a potential future shift towards more conditional support for Israel.

Ukraine should aim to become the 'South Korea' of Europe. This means accepting a negotiated peace or armistice that secures its independence and sovereignty over most of its territory, even if it doesn't reclaim everything. It can then rebuild into a prosperous democracy, creating a stark contrast with a decaying Russia.