The U.S. Navy's ability to track Soviet submarines while keeping its own hidden threatened the USSR's second-strike capability, the cornerstone of nuclear deterrence. This technological and financial asymmetry pushed the Soviets toward de-escalation and ultimately, ending the war.

The development of AI won't stop because of game theory. For competing nations like the US and China, the risk of falling behind is greater than the collective risk of developing the technology. This dynamic makes the AI race an unstoppable force, mirroring the Cold War nuclear arms race and rendering calls for a pause futile.

PGIM's Daleep Singh argues that the risk of mutually assured destruction prevents direct military conflict between nuclear powers. This channels confrontation into the economic sphere, using tools like sanctions and trade policy as primary weapons of statecraft.

Anduril was founded on the thesis that great power conflict was inevitable. The founder argues you cannot wait for war to start before developing defense technology. By then, it's too late for deterrence, and you can only participate in fighting the war, not preventing it.

China's showcase of advanced military hardware, like its new aircraft carrier, is primarily a psychological tool. The strategy is to build a military so 'forbiddingly huge' that the US would hesitate to engage, allowing China to achieve goals like reabsorbing Taiwan without fighting. This suggests their focus is on perceived power to deter intervention.

With the New START treaty gone and doubts about America's commitment to "extended deterrence," especially under Donald Trump, allies in Europe and Asia are debating acquiring their own nuclear weapons. This could lead to a dangerous proliferation free-for-all, increasing the risk of preemptive strikes.

The doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD) relies on the threat of retaliation. However, once an enemy's nuclear missiles are in the air, that threat has failed. Sam Harris argues that launching a counter-strike at that point serves no strategic purpose and is a morally insane act of mass murder.

The current geopolitical landscape shows that nations with nuclear weapons can act with impunity, while non-nuclear nations are vulnerable. The West's hesitant support for Ukraine reinforces this lesson, creating a rational incentive for smaller countries to pursue their own nuclear deterrents, risking dangerous proliferation.

Simulations of a conflict with China consistently show the US depleting its high-end munitions in about seven days. The industrial base then requires two to three years to replenish these stockpiles, revealing a massive gap between military strategy and production capacity that undermines deterrence.