Unlike in private equity, an early-stage venture investment is a bet on the founder. If an early advisor, IP holder, or previous investor holds significant control, it creates friction and hinders the CEO's ability to execute. QED's experience shows that these situations are untenable and should be avoided.

A skilled investor avoided a winning stock because his Limited Partner (LP) base wouldn't tolerate the potential drawdown. This shows that even with strong conviction, a fund's structure and client base can dictate its investment universe, creating opportunities for those with more patient or permanent capital.

Sequoia operates on a consensus model where every partner must agree for an investment to proceed. A single "no" vote can kill a deal. This high-stakes process forces deep conviction, though partners can be convinced to override their own negative intuition if the rest of the team is overwhelmingly positive.

Great investment ideas are often idiosyncratic and contrary to conventional wisdom. A committee structure, which inherently seeks consensus and avoids career risk, is structurally incapable of approving such unconventional bets. To achieve superior results, talented investors must be freed from bureaucratic constraints that favor conformity.

Horowitz's steelman argument for small VC firms is that most firm structures are incompatible with scale. Partnerships with shared control can't make the hard decisions needed to reorganize. Furthermore, a single investment committee with 20 people destroys the candid, truth-seeking conversation essential for good investing.

Large, contrarian investments feel like career risk to partners in a traditional VC firm, leading to bureaucracy and diluted conviction. Founder-led firms with small, centralized decision-making teams can operate with more decisiveness, enabling them to make the bold, potentially firm-defining bets that consensus-driven partnerships would avoid.

VC firms with shared partner control struggle to scale. Growth necessitates periodic reorganizations, which inevitably redistribute power. When partners vote on these changes, they optimize for their local interests, making it impossible to pass the necessary structural updates. This democratic model inherently prevents scaling.

Oren Zeev argues that LPs should seek diversification across their portfolio of GPs, not within a single fund. He believes GPs should be concentrated in their best deals to maximize returns, noting that concentration limits at the fund level don't benefit LPs who are already diversified across many managers.

To foster contrarian thinking and prevent groupthink, Lux Capital allows each investment partner one "silver bullet" per fund. This enables a partner with deep conviction to make an investment even without team consensus, mitigating the risk of missing a brilliant, non-obvious opportunity.