The media landscape has shifted from a few press channels to infinite creator channels. The old strategy was message control ("what can I not say?"). The new strategy is authenticity and volume; a gaffe is fixed by creating more content, not by apologizing.
Horowitz instructs his team to focus on how exceptionally good a founder is at their core competency. He warns against two common errors: passing on a world-class individual due to fixable weaknesses, and investing in a founder with no glaring flaws but no world-class strengths.
Horowitz compares their partnership to the iconic music duo. Andreessen is the rare, star talent ("Michael Jackson"), while Horowitz's strength is creating the structure and surrounding Andreessen with people and ideas to maximize his impact ("Quincy Jones").
Horowitz argues that a board's primary function isn't just strategic advice, but to legally protect the CEO. Running material decisions like equity grants past the board shields the CEO from personal liability and lawsuits—a danger many founders underestimate.
Their dynamic involves Andreessen generating a high volume of ideas for the firm's direction. Horowitz, being more decisive by nature, plays the crucial role of filtering and committing the firm to a specific path, preventing open-ended exploration from stalling progress.
Horowitz categorizes VCs into two types. The all-time greats are "disagreeable" because their independent thinking is crucial. "Agreeable" VCs, who want to be liked, can thrive in boom markets as "heat seekers" by following hot trends, but they often disappear in downturns.
Unlike corporate executives who respect hierarchy, top VCs are idea-generators who resist rules. Horowitz states the key to managing a VC firm is proactive organizational design that minimizes potential conflicts, which are far more destructive than in a typical company.
A16z's "big venture" model was based on two core ideas: first, that Marc Andreessen's "Software is Eating the World" thesis would create 10x more viable companies, and second, that founders required a superior VC "product" with platform services that only scale could provide.
Horowitz cautions against board members having daily, high-frequency interactions. A CEO ultimately must stand alone and develop high conviction to make difficult decisions. Constantly looking to an outsider for answers can stunt this growth and lead to poor outcomes, as the outsider lacks full context.
Horowitz claims a VC firm's ability to win access to the most sought-after deals is more critical to success than its genius for picking winners. A strong brand that ensures access to competitive rounds can generate top-tier returns even with average picking ability.
Horowitz's steelman argument for small VC firms is that most firm structures are incompatible with scale. Partnerships with shared control can't make the hard decisions needed to reorganize. Furthermore, a single investment committee with 20 people destroys the candid, truth-seeking conversation essential for good investing.