Unlike in private equity, an early-stage venture investment is a bet on the founder. If an early advisor, IP holder, or previous investor holds significant control, it creates friction and hinders the CEO's ability to execute. QED's experience shows that these situations are untenable and should be avoided.

A16Z's transformation from a small, generalist partnership to a large, specialized firm was a deliberate answer to a fundamental industry problem: the traditional partner model doesn't scale for deploying capital and making decisions in today's massive, professionalized venture market.

Sequoia operates on a consensus model where every partner must agree for an investment to proceed. A single "no" vote can kill a deal. This high-stakes process forces deep conviction, though partners can be convinced to override their own negative intuition if the rest of the team is overwhelmingly positive.

Great investment ideas are often idiosyncratic and contrary to conventional wisdom. A committee structure, which inherently seeks consensus and avoids career risk, is structurally incapable of approving such unconventional bets. To achieve superior results, talented investors must be freed from bureaucratic constraints that favor conformity.

A business transitions from a founder-dependent "practice" to a scalable "enterprise" only when the founder shares wealth and recognition. Failing to provide equity and public credit prevents attracting and retaining the talent needed for growth, as top performers will leave to become owners themselves.

Large, contrarian investments feel like career risk to partners in a traditional VC firm, leading to bureaucracy and diluted conviction. Founder-led firms with small, centralized decision-making teams can operate with more decisiveness, enabling them to make the bold, potentially firm-defining bets that consensus-driven partnerships would avoid.

The conventional wisdom that a VC can only handle ~8 board seats is incorrect for firms with a strong platform. When a firm provides dedicated teams for recruiting, business development, and policy, partners can scale their time effectively. They are freed to focus on high-leverage strategic advice, not operational tasks.

Managing VCs is harder than managing corporate execs. VCs are high-IQ, disagreeable idea generators who dislike rules. The burden is on leadership to design an organization that minimizes conflict, as VCs can easily 'wreck each other's businesses' through competing investments, making interpersonal issues far more destructive.

Unlike operating companies that seek consistency, VC firms hunt for outliers. This requires a 'stewardship' model that empowers outlier talent with autonomy. A traditional, top-down CEO model that enforces uniformity would stifle the very contrarian thinking necessary for venture success. The job is to enable, not manage.