Despite widespread protests, Iran's repressive state apparatus is highly effective and has shown no signs of cracking. The probability of the regime collapsing from internal pressure alone is extremely low. Niall Ferguson argues that only external intervention, a form of 'regime alteration,' can realistically topple the Islamic Republic.
The US raid to capture Venezuela's president has sparked talk within Iran's elite about a similar "solution": removing Supreme Leader Khamenei to appease protestors and preserve the system, rather than allowing it to collapse entirely under external and internal pressure.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has eclipsed the clergy, controlling major political and economic institutions. Ayatollah Khamenei maintains power through a symbiotic relationship with the IRGC, leveraging their military and economic might, rather than just religious authority.
A destabilized Iranian regime is more dangerous, not less. Israeli intelligence fears Tehran might launch a strike on a foreign enemy like Israel to distract its populace, create a "rally 'round the flag" effect, and restore military pride after recent setbacks.
The ruling elite has inverted from 80% ideologues at the revolution's start to 80% charlatans today. Expedience and financial gain, not revolutionary zeal, now bind the regime's core. This ideological hollowness makes the regime more brittle than its rhetoric suggests.
A clean, external removal of Iran's leadership, similar to what occurred in Venezuela, is unlikely. Iran's population is nearly four times larger, it is geographically distant, and the American political psyche associates the Middle East with costly military entanglements, creating a much higher barrier to intervention.
Reza Pahlavi's strategy is not based on domestic uprising alone. He believes protestors are "sacrificial lambs" who cannot succeed without direct American military intervention, framing them as a "fort waiting for the cavalry." This dependence makes his plan vulnerable to US political shifts.
With its credibility destroyed by bloodshed, the Iranian regime's only remaining leverage over some citizens is the fear of a chaotic power vacuum. The prospect of a full-blown civil war may convince some to tolerate the current oppression over the alternative of total state collapse.
The current Iranian protests are uniquely potent because the regime is at its weakest geopolitically. The loss of regional proxies like Hezbollah and Hamas, coupled with key ally Russia's preoccupation with Ukraine, has left the Iranian government more isolated and vulnerable than during any previous wave of unrest.
Ayatollah Khamenei believes that any attempt at reform, like Gorbachev's in the USSR, would accelerate the regime's collapse rather than prolong it. This formative experience informs his rigid refusal to cede ground on core principles like the mandatory hijab, ensuring a brutal response to dissent.
Despite widespread internal protests and instability, history shows that an external attack is one of the few things that can unify the Iranian population. A potential Israeli strike, meant to weaken the regime, could backfire by creating a 'rally 'round the flag' effect that shores up support for the Ayatollah.