The US government no longer just funds defense-specific space tech. It now mandates that startups demonstrate a clear dual-use commercialization plan, ensuring the technology fosters a broader economic ecosystem and isn't solely reliant on defense budgets.
The Department of Defense is moving from rigid, program-specific contracts to a portfolio model. New Portfolio Acquisition Executives can now reallocate funds from underperforming projects to more promising startups mid-stream, rewarding agility and results over incumbency.
The conflict in Ukraine exposed the vulnerability of expensive, "exquisite" military platforms (like tanks) to inexpensive technologies (like drones). This has shifted defense priorities toward cheap, mass-producible, "attritable" systems. This fundamental change in product and economics creates a massive opportunity for startups to innovate outside the traditional defense prime model.
The Under Secretary of War's primary job is not just to fund technology, but to actively cultivate an ecosystem of new defense contractors. The stated goal is to create five more major companies capable of challenging established primes like Lockheed Martin, fostering competition and bringing new capabilities into the defense sector.
The most effective government role in innovation is to act as a catalyst for high-risk, foundational R&D (like DARPA creating the internet). Once a technology is viable, the government should step aside to allow private sector competition (like SpaceX) to drive down costs and accelerate progress.
A major shift in government procurement for space defense now favors startups. The need for rapid innovation in a newly contested space environment has moved the government from merely tolerating startups to actively seeking them out over traditional prime contractors.
A major upcoming change in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) is the removal of "past performance" as a key criterion in procurement. This rule has historically favored large, incumbent defense contractors over innovative startups. Eliminating it allows new companies to compete on the merits of their technology, representing a significant unlock for the entire defense tech ecosystem.
Tech companies often use government and military contracts as a proving ground to refine complex technologies. This gives military personnel early access to tools, like Palantir a decade ago, long before they become mainstream in the corporate world.
The defense tech sector is experiencing a perfect storm. This 'golden triangle' consists of: 1) Desperate customers in the Pentagon and Congress seeking innovation, 2) A wave of experienced founders graduating from successful firms like SpaceX and Anduril, and 3) Abundant downstream capital ready to fund growth.
Many defense startups fail despite superior technology because the government isn't ready to purchase at scale. Anduril's success hinges on identifying when the customer is ready to adopt new capabilities within a 3-5 year window, making market timing its most critical decision factor.
The go-to-market strategy for defense startups has evolved. While the first wave (e.g., Anduril) had to compete directly with incumbents, the 'Defense 2.0' cohort can grow much faster. They act as suppliers and partners to legacy prime contractors, who are now actively seeking to integrate their advanced technology.