The core justification for the 20-year military engagement in Afghanistan was preventing terrorism in the West. However, the years since the U.S. withdrawal have seen no major surge in attacks, fundamentally questioning the validity of this long-held strategic assumption.

The relative calm in Afghanistan should not be mistaken for successful governance. The primary reason for peace is simply the end of the war itself: the insurgency won and the counterinsurgency collapsed, thus eliminating the main driver of violence for two decades.

The current conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan is complicated by a history of shifting alliances. Many Taliban leaders now being targeted by Pakistan's military once found refuge in Pakistan with the support of the country's security services during the US and NATO mission in Afghanistan, illustrating the region's complex dynamics.

Both Pakistan and Afghanistan are highly exposed to the economic fallout from the war in Iran. Pakistan faces an energy shock, while Afghanistan relies on Iran for food and building materials. This shared vulnerability may compel both sides to seek an off-ramp to their own escalating conflict.

Unlike many insurgent groups, the Taliban maintained a high degree of unity, which was a critical strategic asset. They continue to actively suppress internal divisions, recognizing that their past and future success depends on avoiding the factionalism that plagued their adversaries.

The U.S. killing of Taliban leader Mullah Mansur, who was considered more transactionally-minded, had the unintended consequence of strengthening the group's most conservative wing. The Taliban chose a less divisive, more hardline successor, showing how targeted killings can backfire.

A core, flawed assumption of the Afghanistan campaign was that Pakistan would eventually become an ally and deny safe haven to the Taliban. The U.S. never held Pakistan accountable for its role as a sanctuary and logistics hub, which fatally undermined the entire operation.

The West's five-year strategy of using sanctions, reduced aid, and frozen assets to pressure the Taliban into moderation has not worked. This failure is forcing a reluctant strategic shift, with countries now engaging on issues like migration and counter-terrorism out of necessity.

A core failure of 20 years of U.S. policy was basing its strategy on the flawed hope that Pakistan could be persuaded to act against its own perceived strategic interests. Pakistan was consistently clear about its policies, yet the U.S. operated as if this fundamental conflict could be resolved.