The U.S. killing of Taliban leader Mullah Mansur, who was considered more transactionally-minded, had the unintended consequence of strengthening the group's most conservative wing. The Taliban chose a less divisive, more hardline successor, showing how targeted killings can backfire.
The core justification for the 20-year military engagement in Afghanistan was preventing terrorism in the West. However, the years since the U.S. withdrawal have seen no major surge in attacks, fundamentally questioning the validity of this long-held strategic assumption.
Unlike many insurgent groups, the Taliban maintained a high degree of unity, which was a critical strategic asset. They continue to actively suppress internal divisions, recognizing that their past and future success depends on avoiding the factionalism that plagued their adversaries.
The current conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan, driven by the Taliban sheltering TTP militants, is not a new dynamic. It's a direct reflection of the 'we won't fight your war on our soil' policy that Pakistan itself used for 20 years to harbor the Afghan Taliban.
The relative calm in Afghanistan should not be mistaken for successful governance. The primary reason for peace is simply the end of the war itself: the insurgency won and the counterinsurgency collapsed, thus eliminating the main driver of violence for two decades.
A critical U.S. failure was not pursuing a serious peace process at the peak of its military power in Afghanistan. By waiting until its influence was declining, the chance of a negotiated settlement became vanishingly small, as the Taliban's incentive to compromise had evaporated.
Despite official bans on female education, informal and 'secret' schools persist, with some madrasas even teaching modern subjects. The regime's long-term survival may hinge on this unacknowledged flexibility, which allows society to function despite draconian official policies.
A core failure of 20 years of U.S. policy was basing its strategy on the flawed hope that Pakistan could be persuaded to act against its own perceived strategic interests. Pakistan was consistently clear about its policies, yet the U.S. operated as if this fundamental conflict could be resolved.
For two decades, Afghanistan was a top U.S. priority, consuming vast resources. The fact that the U.S. could completely disengage with no apparent negative strategic consequences suggests the threat was exaggerated or the core mission had already been achieved long before the withdrawal.
Contrary to fears of widespread retribution, the Taliban government has integrated many officials from the previous U.S.-backed administration, even within security agencies. This demonstrates a remarkable and unexpected form of person-to-person reconciliation between former mortal enemies.