The core justification for the 20-year military engagement in Afghanistan was preventing terrorism in the West. However, the years since the U.S. withdrawal have seen no major surge in attacks, fundamentally questioning the validity of this long-held strategic assumption.

Contrary to fears of widespread retribution, the Taliban government has integrated many officials from the previous U.S.-backed administration, even within security agencies. This demonstrates a remarkable and unexpected form of person-to-person reconciliation between former mortal enemies.

In intense conflicts, short-term ceasefires are frequently a strategic maneuver rather than a genuine move towards peace. While peace talks are publicly highlighted, both sides often use the downtime to rebuild their arsenals and rest their forces, making the truce a tool of war itself.

While the Taliban's firm grip on power has drastically reduced violence and brought a sense of peace to daily life, it has come at a severe cost. The economy has collapsed, leaving many in deep poverty, struggling for food, and unemployed, creating a grim trade-off for the Afghan people.

A critical U.S. failure was not pursuing a serious peace process at the peak of its military power in Afghanistan. By waiting until its influence was declining, the chance of a negotiated settlement became vanishingly small, as the Taliban's incentive to compromise had evaporated.

The "absolutely clinical" US raid to capture Venezuela's president is lauded as a military success. However, historical precedents from Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 show that initial military prowess in toppling a regime is no guarantee of long-term strategic success, which depends on far more complex political factors.

For two decades, Afghanistan was a top U.S. priority, consuming vast resources. The fact that the U.S. could completely disengage with no apparent negative strategic consequences suggests the threat was exaggerated or the core mission had already been achieved long before the withdrawal.

Unlike many insurgent groups, the Taliban maintained a high degree of unity, which was a critical strategic asset. They continue to actively suppress internal divisions, recognizing that their past and future success depends on avoiding the factionalism that plagued their adversaries.

The West's five-year strategy of using sanctions, reduced aid, and frozen assets to pressure the Taliban into moderation has not worked. This failure is forcing a reluctant strategic shift, with countries now engaging on issues like migration and counter-terrorism out of necessity.