The current conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan is complicated by a history of shifting alliances. Many Taliban leaders now being targeted by Pakistan's military once found refuge in Pakistan with the support of the country's security services during the US and NATO mission in Afghanistan, illustrating the region's complex dynamics.

Targeting a regime's leader, assuming it will cause collapse, is a fallacy. Resilient, adaptive regimes often replace the fallen leader with a more aggressive individual who is incentivized to lash back simply to establish their own credibility and power.

A critical U.S. failure was not pursuing a serious peace process at the peak of its military power in Afghanistan. By waiting until its influence was declining, the chance of a negotiated settlement became vanishingly small, as the Taliban's incentive to compromise had evaporated.

Regardless of intent, military actions like bombings create personal tragedies that radicalize individuals. This blowback is an unavoidable consequence of war, leading to revenge attacks and perpetuating the conflict, a factor often underestimated in strategic planning.

By assassinating a foreign leader, the U.S. sets a dangerous international precedent. This action removes the "red line" that previously deterred countries like Russia and China from assassinating leaders in Ukraine and Taiwan, potentially escalating global conflicts.

The targeted Iranian supreme leader had issued two religious edicts (fatwas) against developing nuclear weapons. His assassination removed this key restraint and installed his more aggressive son, who has not issued similar edicts, thereby inadvertently accelerating the nuclear threat.

Unlike many insurgent groups, the Taliban maintained a high degree of unity, which was a critical strategic asset. They continue to actively suppress internal divisions, recognizing that their past and future success depends on avoiding the factionalism that plagued their adversaries.

The assassination of Iran's old, restrained leadership paved the way for a new generation of commanders. This new group believes the previous strategy of restraint led to war, and that only aggressive, disproportionate responses can serve as an effective deterrent against the U.S. and Israel.

The West's five-year strategy of using sanctions, reduced aid, and frozen assets to pressure the Taliban into moderation has not worked. This failure is forcing a reluctant strategic shift, with countries now engaging on issues like migration and counter-terrorism out of necessity.