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Contrary to popular comparisons with Ukraine, Taiwan has 'zero chance' of defending itself independently. Its entire military posture is designed to hold out long enough for the United States to intervene, not to win a war of self-defense. This makes U.S. intervention speed the critical factor.
Instead of a risky invasion, Xi Jinping's preference is to slowly suffocate Taiwan's will to resist. This strategy involves chipping away at U.S. commitments and eroding the conviction of regional allies, buying time while avoiding a costly direct conflict.
Beijing’s core strategy for Taiwan is to convince its populace that "resistance is futile" and no outside help is coming. U.S. arms sales and rhetorical support from allies are particularly disruptive because they directly counter this psychological narrative of isolation, undermining China's goal of a coerced unification.
The most effective deterrent to a Chinese invasion of Taiwan isn't more U.S. technology, but a political commitment from Japan to fight from day one. Japan could bring significant military mass to the conflict in just two to three days, compared to the weeks required for U.S. forces.
Taiwan's willingness to prepare and fight is heavily predicated on its belief in potential US support. Ambiguous US policy, characterized as a move from 'strategic ambiguity to just ambiguity,' directly erodes Taiwan's domestic resolve and mobilization efforts.
China is unlikely to use a blockade as its primary reunification strategy. A blockade is a risky precursor because it would give the United States the time it needs to move forces into the region, making a subsequent amphibious assault prohibitively difficult for the PLA.
China's strategy for Taiwan likely mirrors its 2019 Hong Kong takeover. Instead of a direct military assault, Beijing will use political influence, espionage, and legislative changes to create administrative bridges, making any physical resistance illegal before troops ever move in.
Focusing solely on deterring a military invasion of Taiwan is insufficient. The US must develop capabilities to counter China's gray zone tactics and manage the economic fallout of a crisis. Failure to do so could lead to a US concession and a Chinese victory without a shot being fired.
Instead of a full-scale invasion, China is employing an "anaconda strategy" of constant, low-level pressure. Tactics like cutting undersea cables and sending drones are designed to exhaust and demoralize Taiwan, making a military response from the US difficult to justify.
A naval and air blockade, or "cordon sanitaire," presents a more dangerous and likely scenario than a direct cross-strait assault. This strategy would force an enormously difficult political and military decision upon the U.S. about whether to break the blockade and come to Taiwan's aid.
China currently believes its strategy of coercion against Taiwan is succeeding, making a near-term military invasion unlikely. However, 2028 is a critical year. If Taiwan's pro-independence party wins re-election, Beijing may reassess its strategy and consider more dramatic military action.