The first actor required to make a concession in a peace agreement is typically the losing side. The US having to remove its blockade first in the Iran deal indicates it was negotiating from a position of weakness, signaling a loss.
The Pentagon operates like an interagency government itself but lacks a singular decision-making body to synchronize its various components (services, OSD, combatant commands). This leads to a fragmented and uncoordinated response to the China challenge.
China's provocations, like the spy balloon and Volt Typhoon cyberattacks, are designed to expose US vulnerabilities. This forces the incumbent administration into a defensive position, creating political pressure to downplay the incident rather than confront China forcefully.
Asian allies observed Iran withstanding US military pressure. This led them to question the efficacy of China's 'firepower strike complex,' increasing their own confidence in their ability to endure a similar assault from an outside aggressor.
Contrary to concerns that publicizing war preparations would 'spook the population,' Taiwan's President Lai found the public has welcomed overt efforts. Citizens want to be prepared, validating a more direct and public approach to building national resilience.
After decades of military overextension in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Iran, there's a danger the American public will dismiss the unique challenge from China as 'there they go again.' This fatigue makes it difficult to mobilize resources for deterrence against the 'military-industrial complex' narrative.
When questioned on progress, the Pentagon defaults to 'input metrics' like money invested, avoiding 'output metrics' like the number of missiles produced by a specific date. This focus on process over results allows critical projects to languish for years.
Creating a separate command for drones and autonomy could segregate these capabilities, much like CyberCom. Instead of being integrated into combined arms at the lowest level, they become a resource that operational commanders must request through layers of bureaucracy, hindering agility.
Taiwan's willingness to prepare and fight is heavily predicated on its belief in potential US support. Ambiguous US policy, characterized as a move from 'strategic ambiguity to just ambiguity,' directly erodes Taiwan's domestic resolve and mobilization efforts.
The Iran conflict has tied up US naval assets in the Middle East, preventing their deployment to the West Pacific. This validates the US Army's long-held concern that it will lack naval support and have to fight independently in a potential first island chain conflict.
The inconsistent US policy towards China, oscillating between hawkishness and deal-making, discourages allies from taking firm action. Partners fear the US will 'pull the rug out from under them,' leaving them exposed to Chinese retaliation if they act too aggressively.
Strengthening Taiwan's own defense capabilities directly reduces the risk and burden on US forces in a potential conflict. Dollar for dollar, investing in Taiwan's military could be a more efficient use of funds for US security interests than simply adding more to the US budget.