The era of large prime contractors owning an entire system is ending. The companies that will win are those who are highly interoperable, collaborate with other vendors, and integrate best-of-breed capabilities with a low-ego approach, focusing on delivering a mission capability rather than a standalone widget.
To attract innovation, the DoD is shifting its procurement process. Instead of issuing rigid, 300-page requirement documents that favor incumbents, it now defines a problem and asks companies to propose their own novel solutions.
The conflict in Ukraine exposed the vulnerability of expensive, "exquisite" military platforms (like tanks) to inexpensive technologies (like drones). This has shifted defense priorities toward cheap, mass-producible, "attritable" systems. This fundamental change in product and economics creates a massive opportunity for startups to innovate outside the traditional defense prime model.
The Under Secretary of War's primary job is not just to fund technology, but to actively cultivate an ecosystem of new defense contractors. The stated goal is to create five more major companies capable of challenging established primes like Lockheed Martin, fostering competition and bringing new capabilities into the defense sector.
While first-wave defense tech leaders like Anduril pursue a vertically integrated "Apple" model (hardware and software), a new approach is emerging. Companies like Auterion are building a common, open operating system for drones from various manufacturers. This "Android for drones" strategy focuses on creating a wide, interoperable ecosystem rather than a closed, proprietary one.
A major shift in government procurement for space defense now favors startups. The need for rapid innovation in a newly contested space environment has moved the government from merely tolerating startups to actively seeking them out over traditional prime contractors.
The current conception of the defense industrial base focuses on large primes like L3 and General Atomics. However, 98% of US manufacturing is done by small businesses that are not integrated into the defense supply chain. A key investment would be creating a pathway to bring these smaller, agile companies into the fold.
Smaller software companies can't compete with giants like Salesforce or Adobe on an all-in-one basis. They must strategically embrace interoperability and multi-cloud models as a key differentiator. This appeals to customers seeking flexibility and avoiding lock-in to a single vendor's ecosystem.
Traditional defense primes are coupled to customer requirements and won't self-fund speculative projects. "Neo primes" like Epirus operate like product companies, investing their own capital to address military capability gaps, proving out new technologies, and then selling the finished solution.
Unlike consumer or enterprise software, the defense industry has a single major customer per country. This structure favors consolidation. The path to success is not to be a niche SaaS tool but to build a platform that becomes a "national champion," deeply integrated with the nation's defense strategy.
The go-to-market strategy for defense startups has evolved. While the first wave (e.g., Anduril) had to compete directly with incumbents, the 'Defense 2.0' cohort can grow much faster. They act as suppliers and partners to legacy prime contractors, who are now actively seeking to integrate their advanced technology.