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Historian Timothy Snyder argues that for the Trump administration, the fall of the Soviet Union is not a warning but an aspirational model. They see it as a positive example of how aspiring oligarchs can exploit a collapsing state to "come crashing in and steal all the resources" for personal enrichment.

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For the first time, a sitting U.S. president is running businesses where foreign governments invest billions into family funds. This blurs the line between national interest and personal enrichment, mirroring the kleptocratic systems of autocracies like Russia.

The final stage in the decline of a global power, like the British Empire, can involve its own financial elite exploiting populist or socialist policies. While the populace votes for more deficits and government spending, savvy bankers use the resulting inflation and economic turmoil to consolidate wealth and extract value from the collapsing system.

Rather than seeking military conquest, Russia's primary strategy against the US is to foster extreme political polarization. The goal is to push opposing domestic factions into a civil war, causing the American empire to collapse from within.

The greatest threat to a nation's power isn't an external adversary but internal decay. When leaders prioritize personal monetization and political corruption over national interests, they effectively sell off the foundations of their country's strength, leading to a self-inflicted decline from within.

Historically, significant shifts in Russia, like the fall of the Soviet Union, are initiated by elites acting in their own self-interest, not by popular uprisings. The current discontent among oligarchs suggests a similar top-down transition could be forming.

Unlike typical political graft, Kasparov explains that under Trump, corruption is the fundamental system. It's not a bug or an isolated problem but the deliberate and systematic use of state agencies and policies as a mechanism for personal enrichment. This reframes it from a moral failing to a systemic takeover.

To control Eastern Europe after WWII, the Soviets used a replicable playbook. They seized control of defense, interior, and justice ministries to monopolize coercion and information, while using land reform to eliminate old elites and create dependency, all under the fiction of democracy.

The USSR's relatively peaceful end was possible because many elites wanted to join the West. This created an internal pull towards capitulation. In contrast, regimes in China and Iran are built on anti-Western ideologies, making their elites far less likely to be co-opted and their regimes much harder to influence or change.

A dominant system, like the Soviet Union, doesn't simply die; it collapses when its people can envision and transition to a viable alternative (e.g., the US model). The current US-led order faces multiple potential successors—crypto, China's centralized model—which accelerates its potential decline.

Anne Applebaum highlights a disturbing shift where high-stakes foreign policy, like the Ukraine peace plan, is conducted by businesspeople seeking personal financial gain. This mirrors the kleptocratic systems of autocratic states, prioritizing private profit over national or allied interests, and raises questions about who American foreign policy truly serves.