To control Eastern Europe after WWII, the Soviets used a replicable playbook. They seized control of defense, interior, and justice ministries to monopolize coercion and information, while using land reform to eliminate old elites and create dependency, all under the fiction of democracy.
Observing the USSR's fall, the Chinese Communist Party drew key lessons to ensure its survival: use overwhelming force against dissent, prioritize the Party's power monopoly even at the cost of economic efficiency, and aggressively assimilate ethnic minorities to prevent separatism.
Historically, Russia and China's strategy as continental empires involves avoiding two-front wars and actively destabilizing neighboring states. This creates buffer zones and prevents any single power from becoming a threat on their borders, ensuring their own security through regional instability.
The Trump administration's strategy for control isn't writing new authoritarian laws, but aggressively using latent executive authority that past administrations ignored. This demonstrates how a democracy's own structures can be turned against it without passing a single new piece of legislation, as seen with the FCC.
The concept of a five-year plan, common in large corporations and government procurement, was created by Joseph Stalin for the Soviet Union. This rigid, top-down model routinely fails because it cannot adapt to a dynamic world and stifles the rapid iteration necessary for innovation.
Authoritarian leaders like Hugo Chavez systematically dismantle democracy from within after winning elections. They replace competent individuals in the military and government with those who are absolutely loyal, destroying meritocracy to ensure the state apparatus serves the regime, not the people.
In the final weeks of WWII, the Soviet Union invaded Manchuria and dismantled its industrial infrastructure, shipping home the vast majority of its power, mining, and metalworking equipment. This industrial base should have gone to China, which had fought Japan for 15 years, not Russia.
Soviet leaders who lived through WWII understood the unpredictability of direct conflict and preferred proxy wars. Vladimir Putin, in contrast, has consistently used direct "hot wars"—from Chechnya to Georgia to Ukraine—as a primary tool to consolidate power and boost his domestic popularity.
In Russia, nominally private companies like Gazprom function as direct extensions of the state. Their international investments are designed not just for profit but to achieve geopolitical goals, creating a system where foreign policy, business interests, and the personal wealth of the ruling class are completely inseparable.
Command economies inevitably rely on force. In a free society, disagreement is resolved through persuasion. In an authoritarian system where directives are absolute, dissent is ultimately met with force. Adopting a top-down economic model means accepting state-sanctioned violence as a necessary tool.
Stalin's purge of his officer corps before WWII wasn't just paranoia; it was enabled by a Soviet belief that people are interchangeable and hierarchies of expertise are meaningless. This ideological lens allowed him to rationalize destroying his military's most valuable human capital, revealing the danger of combining paranoia with "blank slate" theories.